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Abstract
This essay empirically investigates the dynamics between government debt and budget
deficits in the United States during a recession as opposed to an expansion. We use four
different budget deficits definitions to develop a more comprehensive insight. We estimate
a threshold VAR model on quarterly data from 1947: Q1 to 2016: Q3 on debt to GDP and
budget deficits to GDP ratio for the United States. Specification test using LR test rejects
the null for a linear VAR against nonlinear VAR. The nonlinear impulse responses indicate,
with an increase to budget deficits to GDP ratio, government debt to GDP ratio rise faster
during a recession as opposed to an expansion, and tend to move in a counter-cyclical man-
ner with an increase in the output gap. We can thus infer that governments chose economic
stability over fiscal balance during recessions. With an increase in government debt to GDP
ratio, nonlinear impulse response show budget deficits to GDP ratio grow faster during an
expansion as opposed to a recession and exhibit counter-cyclicality with an increase in the
output gap. All four budget deficits definitions depict similar pattern. Robustness check,
using cyclically adjusted primary budget deficit published by the congressional Budget Of-
fice, also confirm the above findings.
In this essay, we explore the presence of a long run relationship between the monetary
base and the government debt using monthly data from 1942:1 to 2015:12. We apply formal
statistical methods including cointegration and threshold cointegration tests to investigate
the presence of a long-run relationship and estimate a threshold vector error-correction model
(TVECM henceforth) to analyze the short-run dynamics. We find the presence of a threshold
cointegration between the monetary base and government debt. As for the short-run dy-
namics, TVECM estimates show that the speed of adjustment is significant for the growth in
debt equation in both regimes with the signs indicating government adjusting the debt in the
short-run. But the U.S. Fed does not change the monetary base, hence we do not find any
evidence of debt monetization in the U.S. We evaluate our findings over two sub-samples:
1946 to 2015 and 1946 to 2007 for robustness purposes. Findings from both sub-samples
conform to our findings from the full sample.
In this essay, we investigate the impacts of growth in the budget deficit and money supply
on real interest rate are integral to contemporary macroeconomic policy. We employ thresh-
old VAR and nonlinear impulse responses using quarterly data from 1959 to 2015. We find
that growth in money supply and budget deficits have an asymmetric impact on inflation,
short-term interest rate, and real interest rates. Growth in money supply and budget deficits
tend to make the real interest rate negative in a bad state. In a good state, on the other
hand, growth in money supply tend to increase the real interest rate but growth in budget
deficits tend to decrease the real interest rate over the forecast horizon.
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expansion as opposed to a recession and exhibit counter-cyclicality with an increase in the
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using cyclically adjusted primary budget deficit published by the congressional Budget Of-
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In this essay, we explore the presence of a long run relationship between the monetary
base and the government debt using monthly data from 1942:1 to 2015:12. We apply formal
statistical methods including cointegration and threshold cointegration tests to investigate
the presence of a long-run relationship and estimate a threshold vector error-correction model
(TVECM henceforth) to analyze the short-run dynamics. We find the presence of a threshold
cointegration between the monetary base and government debt. As for the short-run dy-
namics, TVECM estimates show that the speed of adjustment is significant for the growth in
debt equation in both regimes with the signs indicating government adjusting the debt in the
short-run. But the U.S. Fed does not change the monetary base, hence we do not find any
evidence of debt monetization in the U.S. We evaluate our findings over two sub-samples:
1946 to 2015 and 1946 to 2007 for robustness purposes. Findings from both sub-samples
conform to our findings from the full sample.
In this essay, we investigate the impacts of growth in the budget deficit and money supply
on real interest rate are integral to contemporary macroeconomic policy. We employ thresh-
old VAR and nonlinear impulse responses using quarterly data from 1959 to 2015. We find
that growth in money supply and budget deficits have an asymmetric impact on inflation,
short-term interest rate, and real interest rates. Growth in money supply and budget deficits
tend to make the real interest rate negative in a bad state. In a good state, on the other
hand, growth in money supply tend to increase the real interest rate but growth in budget
deficits tend to decrease the real interest rate over the forecast horizon.
Table of Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1 Dynamics between government debt and budget deficits in the United States: a
threshold VAR analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Evaluation using Cyclically Adjusted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Relationship between the monetary base and the fiscal debt in the U.S.: evidence
from threshold cointegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Unit Root Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.2 Cointegration and Threshold VECM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
viii
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 Response of short-run interest rate and inflation to budget deficits and money
supply: A nonlinear approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A Nonlinear Impulse Response Computation Algorithm for Chapters 1 and 3 . . . . 83
B TVECM Tables for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
C Sensitivity Analysis TVECM Tables for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Budget Deficit to GDP ration and the Output Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Budget Deficits in the United States, 1947:Q1-2016Q3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Response of Primary Budget Deficit to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Response of Primary Current Budget Deficit to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.7 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.8 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.9 Response of Primary Budget Deficit to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.10 Response of Primary Current Budget Deficit to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.11 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.12 Response of Debt to GDP ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1 Log of Monetary base to GDP and Government debt to GDP, 1947 to 2015 . 31
2.2 Natural log of Monetary Base and Government Debt, 1942 to 2015 . . . . . 36
2.3 Difference in Error Correction Term, Recessions, and Threshold, 1942-1976 . 49
2.4 Difference in Error Correction Term, Recessions, and Threshold, 1977-2015 . 49
3.1 Inflation and Short-term Interest Rate in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Growth in Money Supply and Budget Deficit in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to growth in Money Supply . . . . . 68
3.4 Time path for Real Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5 Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to growth in Budget Deficit . . . . . 70
3.6 Time path for Real Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
x
3.7 Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to Output Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.8 Time path for Real Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.1 Nonlinear Impulse Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.2 Nonlinear Impulse Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
xi
List of Tables
1.1 Specification Test: All TVAR Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Specification Test: Cyclically Adjusted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1 Unit Root Test: Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Unit Root Test: Unknown Structural Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Unit Root Test: First Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Cointegration Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Enders-Granger Threshold Unit Root test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Threshold Cointegration Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7 TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in All) . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in the ECT only) . . . . . 47
2.9 Threshold Unit Root Test: Sub-samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.10 Threshold Cointegration Test: Sub-samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.11 TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in All) . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.12 TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in the ECT only) . . . . . 52
3.1 Specification Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B.1 Threshold Vector Error Correction Model Full Sample, Threshold in All RHS
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B.2 Threshold Vector Error Correction Model Sub-sample: 1946 to 2007, Thresh-
old in All RHS variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
C.1 Threshold Vector Error Correction Model Full Sample, Threshold in ECT Only 90
C.2 Threshold Vector Error Correction Model Full Sample, Threshold in ECT Only 91
xii
Acknowledgments
First of all, blessed be the name of Allah, thy Lord, full of majesty, bounty, and honor.
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all my faculty members at the Depart-
ment of Economics at Kansas State University. The formal academic training I received
from our faculty members has enriched my understanding of economics and enhanced my
research capabilities to accomplish this dissertation research. I am particularly grateful to
Dr. Steven P. Cassou for guiding me personally and professionally. All the chapters in this
dissertation are the result of your thorough and meticulous guidance over the past three
years. I would like to thank Dr. Lance Bachmeier for his guidance with estimation and
coding help. I would also like to thank the faculty members who gave me input during the
graduate student research workshops.
I would like to thank my spouse Jamil Sharmin for being patient with me and supporting
me in achieving this degree. You are a blessing in my life; without your gracious support, I
would not be able to reach this far. You are my courage and my strength.
I would like to thank my parents Mr. Kaosar Ahmed Haydory and Mrs. Rokeya Haydory,
my parents-in-law Mr. Ruhul Amin, and Mrs. Ishrat Naaz, and my children Ahraz Ahmed
Haydory and Zayna Ayesha Haydory. You people are my inspiration.
I would like to thank my sisters and their family, my friends and all the well wishers’ for
your continuous support and blessing. Thanks a lot, everyone.
xiii
Dedication
To my Family.
xiv
Chapter 1
Dynamics between government debt
and budget deficits in the United
States: a threshold VAR analysis
1.1 Introduction
Budget deficits, resulting either from a tax cut or an increase in government spending, will
impact government debt. Rising government debt may subsequently shape future budget
balance through policies aimed at deficit reduction. Government authorities justify auster-
ity and deficit reduction by arguing for sustainable fiscal policy, which will prevent further
debt accumulation, and therefore put less pressure on monetary policy (Uctum and Wickens,
2000). In recent times, the expansionary fiscal policy was used to curb the depressing con-
sequences of the Great Recession resulting in increased budget deficits, subsequently raising
government debt in the United States. The post-WWII period has seen several recessions in
the United States, for which the expansionary fiscal policy tools were adopted. During which
tax cuts, and/or, spending increase were pursued to stabilize the economy. Political conflicts
such as the Korean War, the Cold War, and post- 9/11 era are marked by rising defense
spending. We also observe an increasing trend in non-discretionary government spending
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since the late 1980s. All these factors jointly contributed towards increases in the budget
deficit. Subsequently, government debt in the United States has grown over time along with
budget deficits (Thornton, 2012). Economists have investigated the sustainability of the
fiscal policy with rising debt (Davig, 2005; Quintos, 1995). Bohn (1998, 2007) uses a policy
reaction function interpretation to investigate government debt sustainability in the United
States. He argues that historically corrective measures were implemented to respond to
government debt whenever the debt to GDP ratio is increasing. Sustainability of debt and
budget deficits is well researched in the existing literature. A political economy approach
explains the budget deficits and debt as a consequence of political competition between the
incumbent and successor, where the incumbent prefers debt and budget deficits to limit
government spending choices for the successor (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Persson and
Svensson, 1989). However, is the relationship between the government debt and the budget
deficits asymmetric in nature? Do we observe cyclicality? Cassou et al. (2015) investigate
asymmetry between the government debt and the primary budget deficit using a structure
analogous to Bohn (1998, 2007), and find asymmetry for sustainability as well as cyclicality
of the budget deficit in the United States.
An expansionary fiscal policy is prescribed during recessions to stabilize the economy.
Policy makers generally are more concerned to stabilize the economy during economic re-
cessions. As such we observe expansionary fiscal policies are designed and implemented,
with either an increase in the government spending or tax cuts, during recessions. Thus we
observe an increase in the budget deficit leading to more government debt during recessions.
We do not observe the use of expansionary fiscal policy during economic expansions. Hence,
we can argue that government’s policy response during economic recessions and expansions
are nonlinear in nature. Figure 1.1 below presents primary budget deficit to GDP ratio
and the output gap for the United States from 1947 to 2016. The shaded areas represent
recessions using the National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle dates. We observe
the primary budget deficit to GDP ratio to rise during recessions. At the same time, there
are several periods where the deficit to GDP ratio increases even though the economy was
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expanding. The business cycle fluctuations motivate the government’s policy choice between
economic stabilization versus balancing the budget. Analyzing the nature of the dynamics
of the budget deficit and the government debt along with business cycle fluctuations is thus
imperative. In recent times during the Great Recession, we observed European governments
with large debt burdens tend to go for austerity measures at times of economic stress, despite
the usual policy prescription that economic stabilization needs fiscal expansion. The nature
of the variations in policy choice adopted during a recession as opposed to an expansion,
either pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical, can help us infer about the government’s policy choices.
Figure 1.1: Budget Deficit to GDP ration and the Output Gap
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In the existing literature, it remains unanswered how the budget deficits impact the gov-
ernment debt during recessions as opposed to expansions, and vice-versa. We investigate
how the budget deficit impacts the dynamics of the government debt during recessions as
well as during expansions, and vice-versa. This essay augments the existing literature in a
number of ways. First, we use four different measure of budget deficits, which provide us
a more comprehensive picture of the budget balances. Second, we analyze the dynamics of
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the government debt and the budget deficits during recessions and expansions in a more
objective manner. As such we use the regime-switching threshold vector auto-regression
(henceforth TVAR) model to derive the impulse response, which enables us to understand
the dynamics during a recession as opposed to an expansion. Finally, our sample covers
the whole of the post-WWII period from 1947: Q1 to 2016: Q3, which includes the Great
Recession. The non-linear impulse responses indicate, with an increase in budget deficits
to GDP ratio, the government debt tends to rise faster during the recessions vis-a`-vis the
expansions, and tend to grow in a counter-cyclical manner with an increase in the output
gap. We can thus infer that governments chose economic stability over fiscal balance during
recessions. However, with an increase to government debt to GDP ratio, budget deficits tend
to grow faster during the expansions vis-a`-vis the recessions, and exhibit counter-cyclicality
with an increase in the output gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the relevant literature,
in Section 1.3 we discuss the data and methodology, and Section 1.4 presents the results,
and Section 1.5 discusses the conclusion.
1.2 Literature Review
Research investigations on the government debt and the budget deficits vary in their ap-
proach. However, the literature on the dynamics of the government debt and the budget
deficits focusing on asymmetry and cyclicality are sparse. The issue of debt sustainabil-
ity is well researched; we can find single country studies using the time-series econometric
techniques as well as cross-country evidence based on the panel data models. There are
papers that use the theoretical structural models to analyze numerous aspects along with
sustainability related to the budget deficit and debt. The question of debt sustainability is a
key aspect of the existing literature. Empirical studies based on time-series techniques focus
on stationarity and cointegration between the budget deficit and the debt. This approach
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implies that the deficit and the debt are sustainable as they satisfy certain statistical proper-
ties. The theoretical papers investigate how larger debt could potentially impact future tax
structure or economic growth. The economic question of debt sustainability is often loosely
defined or remain vague.
There are two approaches that dominate the literature analyzing the sustainability of
government debt and budget deficits in the literature using the time-series techniques. The
first consists of testing the stationarity of the debt and/or the budget deficits. Other stud-
ies look for a cointegrating relationship linking the primary budget deficits, the stock of
outstanding debt and interest payments for the United States. Results vary with the specifi-
cation of the budget constraint used in the research. Barro (1986) investigate the relationship
between debt and budget deficits while addressing cyclicality in the econometric specifica-
tion. He reports a strong counter-cyclical behavior of budget deficits in the United States.
Hamilton and Flavin (1985) reject the non-stationarity of constant-dollar undiscounted gov-
ernment debt in the United States under the assumption of constant real interest rates.
Wilcox (1989) allows for stochastic interest rates and trends, finding discounted government
debt in the United States is non-stationary. Hamilton and Flavin (1985),Trehan and Walsh
(1988),Quintos (1995), and Davig (2005) find evidence in support of sustainability. In con-
trast,Kremers (1989) and Hakkio and Rush (1991) show that in recent years fiscal policy
violates the inter-temporal budget constraint. In particular, Kremers (1989) showed the
empirical finding of Hamilton and Flavin (1985) is reversed once their ADF regression for
the budget balance, which suffers from autocorrelation, is extended to include the second
lagged difference of the budget balance as an additional regressor in order to eliminate the
autocorrelation problem. Ahmed and Rogers (1995), using historical data that goes back
to 1700s, find strong evidence favoring the sustainability of the fiscal policy in the United
States and some support for the sustainability of the United Kingdom. Arestis et al. (2004)
find that large budget deficits in the United States are sustainable in the long run as policy
makers will intervene to reduce per capita deficit when it reaches a certain threshold. They
use threshold autoregression on data spanning from 1947 to 2002, where the regression equa-
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tion stems from the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
Bohn (2007) argues that using stationarity and cointegration methodology in analyzing
the sustainability of budget deficit and government debt is not the valid approach. Cas-
sou et al. (2015) investigate the sustainability and cyclicality incorporating asymmetry in
the structure analogous to Bohn (1998). They use three different model specifications over
a short and a long sample (this includes the Great Recession) to investigate asymmetry
between primary budget deficits and debt in the United States. They find fiscal policy is
asymmetric for the long sample, as the response of primary budget deficits to lagged govern-
ment debt is asymmetric. But the asymmetry disappears for the short sample. They find
evidence in support of fiscal sustainability for the short sample but this disappears for the
long sample.
Fiscal rules, such as the stability and growth pact (SGP), aim at constraining govern-
ment spending. Governments revert to creative accounting to circumvent such rules and in
the process hide budget deficits. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) provide empirical evidence
of creative accounting in the European Union countries. Their two-stage IV regression in a
dynamic panel setup find the tendency to substitute budget deficits with creative accounting
is especially strong for cyclical component of the deficit. In times of recession, interest in
reducing the budget deficit is particularly large. Hatzinikolaou and Simos (2013) suggest
a new test for sustainability of budget deficits. In particular, they define sustainability by
requiring formally that both the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied (i.e. the dis-
counted debt converges to zero) and the undiscounted debt is bounded. According to this
more restrictive definition, Hatzinikolaou and Simos (2013) found empirical evidence against
the sustainability of budget deficits in the United States. Balassone et al. (2010) uses a panel
for 14 European Union countries and finds cyclical asymmetry between budget deficits and
government debt. Mahdavi (2014) uses a panel data model on data comprised from 48 U.S.
states to investigate the state fiscal sustainability using the framework proposed by Bohn
(1998). He finds the positive response of primary budget surpluses (negative primary budget
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deficits) to government debt is the sufficient condition for sustainability.
There are theoretical papers that also address the linkage between debt and budget
deficits, explore their impacts on growth, as well as potential changes in the tax structure
of future budgets. Barro (1979, 1987), Lucas and Stokey (1983) explain the role of bud-
get deficits and debt accumulation to explain redistribution of income over time and across
generations, as well as to explain the how these two minimize the deadweight losses of tax-
ation for the provision of public goods. These papers, perhaps, explain the accumulation of
government debt in peace times. Uctum and Wickens (2000) derived conditions suitable for
determining the sustainability of fiscal policy in the long run, in the medium term, and in the
presence of debt and budget deficits ceilings for the E.U. and the United States using data
ranging from 1965-1994. Using infinite horizon models for long run they do not find evidence
for sustainability for many countries. However, there is some evidence that the government
discounted net debt is mean-reverting for a few countries, implying that their fiscal policies
are sustainable. The evidence in favor of sustainability is strengthened for most countries
when data are extended to incorporate future fiscal consolidation plans. They argue that
in practice governments also need a medium-term framework for fiscal policy. Uctum and
Wickens (2000) have shown that in the absence of ceilings most countries have sustainable
fiscal policies in the medium term. This is in contrast to the result of the infinite horizon
analysis. Furthermore, they find that imposing deficit or debt limits in the medium term
throws most government budgets onto an inter-temporally inconsistent path. They further
argue that such arbitrary ceilings confound the government debt and fiscal sustainability as
they do not take account of cyclical factors.
Bra¨uninger (2005) analyze the impact of public debt on endogenous growth using an
overlapping generations model setup. He assumes that government fixes the budget deficits
ratio. When the budget deficits ratio is below a critical level there are two potential steady
states - capital, output, and government debt all grow at a constant rate, and, increase in
deficits ratio reduces the growth rate. As and when the budget deficits ratio exceeds the
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critical level, there is no steady state with capital growth declining continuously. Marcet and
Scott (2009) investigate the relationship between optimal tax and stochastic behavior of debt
for the United States. Under complete market, they find, debt is the same or less persistent
and it declines in response to a shock that causes deficits to rise. Under incomplete market,
debt is persistent and increases in response to a shock that causes higher deficits. Authors
argue that the U.S. data is more akin to incomplete market. These papers, although differ in
approach and research questions, indicate that investigating dynamics between government
debt and budget deficits in a linear framework may not be sufficient to develop an in-depth
insight.
Budget deficits and debt are explained as strategic tools used by competing political
governments in the political economy literature. These models are intended to explain the
growth in budget deficits and debt in peace times when economic stabilization is unwar-
ranted. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) find a bias toward budget deficits by the incumbent in
a model of political competition between political actors- incumbent and future successor.
The incumbent uses debt accumulation strategically to influence the choices of its successors.
Disagreement among the political parties and uncertainty about who will get elected next pe-
riod prevent the incumbent from internalizing the cost of leaving debt to its successors. The
resulting equilibrium stock of public debt tends to be higher than socially optimum choice.
Their results also show that government debt tends to get larger with public consumption
expenditure. Persson and Svensson (1989) consider a model where two policy-makers have
different views about the level of public expenditure. Their results show that a conservative
incumbent policy-maker (one who likes less public expenditure) has a bias towards deficits
to force the liberal successor to spend less. Conversely, the liberal incumbent may choose to
leave a surplus to its conservative successor.
The extent of an increase in government spending or the tax cuts intended to invigorate
aggregate demand during recessions in recent years in the United States render the above
arguments less attractive as most of these literature do not address the state of the macroe-
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conomy and subsequent response from the policy makers. In Europe, on the other hand, we
observe the case of austerity measures domination the policy space in recent years. The Great
Recession era presents us with a divergent picture on how budget deficits and government
debt interact in designing macroeconomic stabilization policy. The aforementioned literature
does not fully explain the governments rationale for macroeconomic policies in contemporary
times. Even though, we find a large volume of empirical literature that acknowledge the im-
portance and significance of cyclicality while analyzing budget deficit and government debt.
In particular, the literature thus far does not explore the dynamics between government debt
and budget deficit during recessions juxtaposed against expansions. The definition of budget
deficits also focuses largely on primary budget deficits. In this paper, we will explore the
dynamics between government debt and budget deficits using the nonlinear time-series econo-
metric specification that allows us to incorporate the business cycle aspects. We use four
different definitions for budget deficits in the United States. Thus we expand the discussion
on dynamics between government debt and budget deficits filling a gap hitherto unaddressed.
1.3 Data and Methodology
In this paper, we use quarterly data from 1947: Q1 to 2016: Q3 collected from the National
Income and Product Account (henceforth NIPA) tables and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
for the United States. We collected real GDP, the GDP deflator, and government spending
and receipt data from the NIPA tables available in the United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis website. Data on government debt are collected from Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas website.
We use the following definitions to measure budget deficits1 in the United States. Primary
deficits and primary current deficits show by how much government receipts fall short of the
1We use the budget deficits definition as in Macroeconomics, 9th Ed., authored by Andrew B. Abel, Ben
S. Bernanke and Dean Croushore published by Pearson.
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spending outlays each period. On the other hand, gross deficits and current deficits show
how much the government needs to borrow each period.
• Gross Budget Deficit = Government Outlays - Government Receipts = (Government
Purchase + Transfer and Subsidies +Net Interest Payment) - Government Receipts
• Primary Budget Deficit = Gross Deficit - Net Interest Payment
• Current Budget Deficit = (Gross Deficit + Government Investment Expenditure) -
Government Receipts
• Primary Current Budget Deficit = Current Deficit - Net Interest Payment
Figure 1.2: Budget Deficits in the United States, 1947:Q1-2016Q3
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2. All the measures are in real terms.
Figure 1.2 show the budget deficits in the United States 2, as per the four definitions
we are using for this paper. We observe the budget deficits show relatively less variability
until the early 1970s. The mid-1970s visibly depict a decline in the budget deficits and a
2We use the GDP deflator to convert the nominal values into real terms.
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similar pattern emerges during the presidency of Bill Clinton. The 1980s depict a large rise
in budget deficits and also during the Great Recession years. Subsequently, we observe a
continuous decline in the budget deficits during the last few years in our sample.
All the variables used are in real terms in the subsequent analysis. We use the following
variables: debt to GDP ratio, budget deficits to GDP ratio3 and the output gap. There
are different ways to measure the output gap in the existing literature. For example, one
can use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). However, Mise et al.
(2005) argue that such filters are not adequate to fully capture the output gap as the HP
filter produces series with spurious dynamic relations that have no basis in the underlying
data-generating process. Following Cassou et al. (2015) the output gap is defined as the
deviation of the observed annual output growth rate from its long-term average. For the
output gap, we computed the difference between the observed annual growth rate and the
average growth rate over the sample period of 1947 to 2016. In particular, we computed
the growth rate in percentage terms by multiplying 100 times the log difference between the
current value of real GDP and the value four quarters earlier. In the next step these growth
rates were averaged and then the average was subtracted from the annual growth rate series.
The resulting series has positive values when the current growth rate exceeds the average
and negative values when the growth rate is below the average.
In this paper, the endogenous threshold VAR is estimated following the method proposed
by Tsay (1998), and, Lo and Zivot (2001) using the output gap as our threshold variable.
They generalize the univariate and single equation estimation by Tong (1990), Chan (1993)
and Hansen (1996) for a multivariate VAR. We will estimate an endogenous threshold VAR
(TVAR) model and compute the nonlinear impulse responses to explore the dynamics be-
tween government debt and budget deficits. Why endogenous threshold VAR? Afonso et al.
(2011) note that the endogenous TVAR model has a number of interesting features. First,
3We have four different budget deficits to GDP ratio for our four different budget deficit definitions. We
use each for a separate estimation.
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it is a relatively simple way to capture possible nonlinearities such as asymmetric reactions
to shocks or the existence of multiple equilibria. As the effects of the shocks are allowed to
depend on the size and the sign of the shock, and also on the initial conditions, the impulse
response functions are no longer linear, and it is possible to distinguish, for instance, between
the effects of fiscal developments under different economic states. Second, another advan-
tage of the endogenous TVAR methodology is that the variable by which different regimes
are defined itself is an endogenous variable included in the VAR. Therefore, this makes it
possible that regime switches may occur after the shock to each variable. In particular, fiscal
expansion through a budget deficits shock might either boost the output or increase the
debt that harms the prospects of economic growth, and the overall effect to the economy of
a fiscal expansion through increased budget deficits might become negative.
The endogenous threshold VAR (TVAR) can be specified in the following manner, where
the lag order is based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC):
Y Gt = It
[
αL +
p∑
i=1
αiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
αjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
αkY Gt−k
]
+
(1− It)
[
αH +
p∑
i=1
αiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
αjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
αkY Gt−k
]
+ t,Y G
(1.1)
DTt = It
[
βL +
p∑
i=1
βiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
βjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
βkY Gt−k
]
+
(1− It)
[
βH +
p∑
i=1
βiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
βjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
βkY Gt−k
]
+ t,DT
(1.2)
DFt = It
[
γL +
p∑
i=1
γiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
γjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
γkY Gt−k
]
+
(1− It)
[
γH +
p∑
i=1
γiDTt−i +
p∑
j=1
γjDFt−j +
p∑
k=1
γkY Gt−k
]
+ t,DF
(1.3)
where Y Gt is the measure of the output gap at time t, DTt is debt to GDP ratio at time
t, and DFt is deficit to GDP ratio at time t. α, β, and γ are the estimated parameters of the
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model, and p represent the lag length selected using the information criterion. The output
gap variable is our endogenous threshold variable such that:
It =

1 if Y Gt−d ≤ τ
0 if Y Gt−d > τ
(1.4)
I[.] is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when the output gap Y Gt−d is less
than or equal to the threshold τ , and 0 otherwise. The time lag for the output gap is set
to 1 (that is d=1 ). We arrange the output gap variable in a ascending order and trim the
top 15% and the bottom 15% in order to avoid over-fitting. We compute a VAR model for
each of the output gap values and obtain the sum-squared of the residuals. We chose the
output gap corresponding to the lowest sum-squared of the residuals as our threshold and
the corresponding model as our threshold VAR model. We interpret the model below the
threshold as bad state, which is assumed to be the state of recession. The model above the
threshold is interpreted as good state, which we assume to be the state of expansion.
Since we are estimating a threshold VAR model it is imperative that we address the idea
of a specification test. We carry out a likelihood ratio test with the null of linear VAR model
against the nonlinear alternative. Since we are estimating a threshold VAR model and the
threshold value is not known a priori, the testing procedure involves non-standard inference,
because τ is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold. Therefore, first, the
TVAR model is estimated for all possible values of τ (to avoid over-fitting, the possible
values were set so that at least 15% of the observations fall under each regime). This test is
the multivariate extension proposed by Lo and Zivot (2001) of the linearity test of Hansen
(1996). Instead of an F-test comparing the SSR for the univariate case, a Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test comparing the covariance matrix of each model is computed.
LRij = T
[
ln(det
∑ˆ
i
)− ln(det
∑ˆ
j
)
]
(1.5)
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where
∑ˆ
i is the estimated covariance matrix of the model with i regimes(e.g. i=1 imply
an one threshold regime). In this paper, we test a linear model against 2 regime threshold
alternative.
In a linear model, the impulse responses can be derived directly from the estimated
coefficients and the estimated responses are symmetric both in terms of the sign and the size
of the structural shocks. Furthermore, these impulse responses are constant over time as the
covariance structure does not change. These convenient properties do not hold within the
class of nonlinear models as shown in Koop et al. (1996). As per Enders (2010), interpretation
of the impulse responses is history dependent. The impact of a shock on the time path of
the system depends on the magnitude of the current and subsequent shocks. The sign, as
well as size of the shocks, are important. For example, the impact of a negative shock on the
time-path of the system in a contractionary regime will be different than an expansionary
regime. The moving average representation of the TVAR is nonlinear in the structural
disturbances. Because some shocks may lead to switches between regimes, and thus their
Wold decomposition does not exist (Afonso et al., 2011). Consequently, in contrast to linear
models, we cannot construct the impulse responses as the paths the variables follow after
an initial shock, assuming that no other shock hits the system. To cope with these issues
Koop et al. (1996) proposed nonlinear impulse response functions defined as the difference
between the forecasted paths of variables with and without a shock to a variable of interest.
Formally, the nonlinear impulse responses functions (NIRF) are defined as:
NIRFY (k, t,Ωt−1) = E(Yt+k|t,Ωt−1)− E(Yt+k|Ωt−1) (1.6)
where Yt+k is a vector of forecasts at horizon k, Ωt−1 is the available information set, and t is
the shock at time t.The following discussion draws on Afonso et al. (2011). This formulation
implies that the impulse response functions depend on the initial conditions and that there is
no restriction regarding the symmetry of the shocks. Therefore, in order to get the complete
information about the dynamics of the model, the impulse responses have to be simulated
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for various sizes and for the signs of the shocks. The algorithm proceeds as follows. First, the
shocks for the periods from 0 to q are drawn from the residuals of the estimated VAR model.
Then, for each initial value, that is for each point of our sample, this sequence of shocks is
fed through the model to produce forecasts conditional on initial conditions. These steps are
repeated for the same initial condition and the same set of residuals except for the shock to
the variable of interest, which is set to (+/-) 1 standard error and (+/-) 2 standard errors at
time 0. Second, we can calculate the forecasts conditional on the shocks and on the initial
conditions with and without an additional shock at t = 0, and the difference between these
two is the impulse response function. This procedure is replicated 500-times for each initial
condition, and then we compute averages over the initial conditions from each regime to get
the average impulse responses. We compute nonlinear impulse responses for two regimes
defined by the threshold VAR above.
1.4 Results and Analysis
In this section, we present the results and analysis. We begin our analysis comparing the
model specification. Table 1.2 below present the likelihood ratio based specification tests
described earlier. We estimate four threshold VAR models with a lag-length of 2 (as per the
AIC), where each model is estimated with a separate budget deficits definition. In all cases,
we reject the null of linear VAR against the alternative of 2 regimes one threshold VAR4.
Thus, estimating a threshold model is justified5. The endogenously estimated threshold de-
fines the two regimes. For example, when output gap falls below 1.64 the corresponding
model is our bad state or the recessionary state. When the output gap is above threshold
4 Model with Primary Budget Deficit to GDP ratio has 81.8% observation in the regime above the thresh-
old and 18.2% are below threshold,model with Gross Budget Deficit to GDP ratio has 81.8% observation in
the regime above the threshold and 18.2% are below threshold, model with Current Budget Deficit to GDP
ratio has 80.7% observation in the regime above the threshold and 19.3% are below threshold, and model
with Primary Current Budget Deficit to GDP ratio has 80.7% observation in the regime above the threshold
and 19.3% are below threshold.
5The homoskedastic bootstrap distribution of the critical values are based on the residuals from the H0
model.
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value of 1.64 the corresponding model is our good state or the expansionary state.
Table 1.1: Specification Test: All TVAR Models
Model
Threshold
τ
H0: Linear VAR
Gross Budget
Deficit to GDP ratio
1.64
44.03*
(0.06)
Primary Budget Deficit
to GDP ratio
1.64
49.51**
(0.02)
Current Budget
Deficit to GDP ratio
1.57
63.30***
(0.00)
Primary Current
Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
1.54
64.31***
(0.00)
Note:p-value in the parenthesis
We proceed to nonlinear impulse response analyses below. We estimate two sets of im-
pulse response- a good state and a bad state as per our threshold VAR model. We present
the nonlinear impulse responses for each variable to a positive 1 standard deviation increase
in the other. Figures below present the good state (expansion) and bad state (recession)
comparisons. These impulse responses present us a visual comparison of how one variable is
behaving over the forecast horizon with respect to an increase in the other during good state
and bad state. We estimate four different models for each of the budget deficit definitions.
For the purpose of brevity, we will present and discuss the nonlinear impulse responses for
the models estimated with primary budget deficit to GDP and primary current deficit to
GDP ratios6. By definition, primary budget deficit and primary current deficit measures
depict by how much government receipts fall short of the government spending outlays each
period. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 below present the nonlinear impulse responses of the debt to
GDP ratio. A +1 standard deviation increase in the primary budget deficit to GDP ratio
increases the debt to GDP ratio over the forecast horizon. We also observe the debt to GDP
ratio grows faster during a bad state (recessions) as opposed to a good state (expansions).
6Please see Appendix A for the remaining nonlinear impulse responses.
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For example, The debt to GDP ratio rises to about 0.7 after 4 quarters in a bad state,
whereas in the good state it rises to about 0.5 after about 4 quarters with respect to an
increase in the primary budget deficit to GDP ratio. The impulse responses indicate the
debt to GDP ratio shows an asymmetric response. The debt to GDP ratio rises much faster
during a bad state and remains at a higher level than the responses during a good state.
We find the same pattern of response in debt to GDP ratio for all the budget deficit defi-
nitions used in this essay (the nonlinear impulse responses for the rest are in the appendix
A). Arguably, the government prioritizes economic stabilization during a recession instead of
maintaining fiscal balance. Thus adopting an expansionary fiscal policy that raises budget
deficits, henceforth increasing the debt. These findings are consistent with the history of
United States as there were several examples of tax cuts, and/or, increases in governments
discretionary spending (at times both) by the government to stimulate the economy during
recessions. Budget deficits, resulting from the fiscal stimulus, always increase the govern-
ment debt in the United States.Cassou et al. (2015) also find asymmetry, and the impulses
responses conform to theoretical predictions in Marcet and Scott (2009).
Figure 1.3: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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Note: +1 standard deviation increase in primary budget deficit to GDP ratio 
17
Figure 1.4: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present the good state (expansions) and bad state (recessions) com-
parisons of the nonlinear impulse response of budget deficits to GDP ratio to a +1 standard
deviation increase in the debt to GDP ratio. For both the budget deficit definitions, we
observe a positive 1 standard deviation increase in the debt to GDP ratio does not increase
budget deficit to GDP ratio in a bad state. During a good state, We observe the budget
deficit to GDP ratio rises very fast after a quarter before it starts to become negative after
about 5 quarters. In the bad state, on the other hand, the budget deficit to GDP ratio re-
sponds very slowly and rises after about 3 quarters over the forecast horizon (for the primary
current budget deficit to GDP ratio). Budget deficits are related to macroeconomic policy,
and, contingent upon the state of the economy. During recessions, the government has the
incentive use an expansionary fiscal policy. But a higher debt level may erase the motivation
in favor of austerity7 During an economic expansion, on the other hand, the necessity to sta-
bilize the economy is not binding for the government. We observe the budget deficits to GDP
ratio to increase in a good state for few quarters and subsequently they fall. In the U.S., the
7The economic situation across some of the European economies such as Greece, U.K., and Portugal
during the Great Recession are examples of such a scenario.
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sharp rise in the budget deficits to GDP ratio during a good state as opposed to a bad state
could stem from the interest rate differential in the U.S. We know the interest rates usually
remain at a higher level during economic expansions and are usually lower during recessions.
As such, the rise in debt may increase the budget deficit in the good state due to higher
interest rate. Also, the components of the budget as well. The non-discretionary component
of the budget is dictated by certain statutes and require Congressional deliberation for any
changes. As per the impulse responses, the deficit does not remain high, rather they decline
after about 4 quarters. During the Regan era, we observe the budget deficit to rise very fast
due to the tax cuts. These results conform to predictions in Uctum and Wickens (2000). We
observe the deficit to GDP ratio gradually fall over the forecast horizon. Despite an initial
surge, the ensuing decline in budget deficits over the forecast horizon indicate governments
prefer to reduce deficits over time when debt to GDP ratio rises conforming to findings in
Arestis et al. (2004).
Figure 1.5: Response of Primary Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
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In the figures 1.7 and 1.8, we present the nonlinear impulse responses of the debt to
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Figure 1.6: Response of Primary Current Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
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GDP ratio with respect to a +1 standard deviation increase in the output gap. For intuitive
purposes lets assume that these positive 1 standard deviation increase in the output gap are
positive technology shocks that boost the economys productivity, thus output. A positive 1
standard deviation increase in output gap implies the economy is expanding. We can argue
that when the economy starts to recover or expand, components of the aggregate demand
increase and unemployment rate starts to go down. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the nonlinear
impulse responses for each state. Here the debt to GDP ratio falls immediately with respect
to a +1 increase in the output gap. We observe the debt to GDP ratio is falling in both
states, although the rate is faster in a good state as opposed to a bad state. This shows
that debt to GDP postulates some counter-cyclicality in bad state conforming to findings of
Cassou et al. (2015). The decline in the debt to GDP ratio could potentially emerge from
the fact that the increase in the output raises the governments tax revenues through the tax
code along with reduction in the welfare payments (this reduces government spending), thus
reducing budget deficit, and at the same time ability for subsequent debt repayment.
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Figure 1.7: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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Figure 1.8: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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Figures 1.9 and 1.10 below, we present the nonlinear impulse responses of budget deficits
to GDP ratio with respect to a positive 1 standard deviation increase in the output gap.
The impulse response below indicates an increase in the output gap reduces budget deficits
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on impact. A positive increase in the output gap may reduce budget deficits through in-
creases in tax revenues as well as a reduction in some of the components of discretionary
government spending. We observe the budget deficit to GDP ratio, during the bad state,
do not portray a steady decline as opposed to the good state. On impact, the deficit to
GDP ratio falls but during the bad state, it worsens relative to the good state. However,
the budget deficits to GDP ratio do not show a steady reduction over the forecast horizon
for both states. We observe the asymmetric response of budget deficits to GDP ratio over
the forecast horizon and degree of counter-cyclicality is different in a bad state relative to a
good state. Arguably, during a bad state (recession) the government policy makers opt for
economic stabilization adopting expansionary fiscal policy tools. This corroborates to our
earlier findings. The relatively slow and non-decreasing nature of the deficit to GDP ratio
in a bad state also indicates to the government’s policy choice.
Figure 1.9: Response of Primary Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
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Figure 1.10: Response of Primary Current Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
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1.4.1 Evaluation using Cyclically Adjusted Data
Thus far, our analysis of the dynamics between budget deficits and debt is conducted using
data from the NIPA sources. One potential criticism may arise due to cyclical adjustments.
As we know, there are automatic stabilizers designed within the fiscal system, especially
the tax code and some of the spending programs (especially transfers) to counter business
cycle fluctuations. These automatic stabilizers influence the government revenues as well as
the expenditures during expansions and contractions of the business cycle. Thus the bud-
get deficit measures may reflect this cyclicality. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) use the
cyclically adjusted data, Cassou et al. (2015) note that using cyclically adjusted data may
be advantageous because they reflect the true reaction function of the policy makers. The
cyclically adjusted data eliminate the built-in fiscal measures, thus showing actual contem-
poraneous budgetary decisions. However, there are economists who argue that automatic
stabilizers are also policy decisions, hence using the observed data is sufficient. Regardless of
the debate, it is useful to investigate whether the results described above are robust using the
cyclically adjusted budget data. For our analysis, we use cyclically adjusted data computed
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by the Congressional Budget Office of the United States (CBO).
In the process, we face two problems. First, one problem with this data is a period
of availability is 1963: Q3 to 2013: Q3, whereas our analysis uses data from 1947: Q1 to
2015: Q3. Although there are several CBO sources of data, we chose to use the data from
a single source that was put out in 2014 in a document called The Budget and Economic
Outlook: 2014 to 2024. A second problem that we face is the other definitions of deficits.
We are only able to compute the primary budget deficits, but could not compute the other
definitions used in this paper. Thus, we confine our analysis to the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary budget deficit to GDP ratio. As in our previous analysis, we estimate an endogenous
threshold VAR using the output gap as our endogenous threshold variable and compute the
nonlinear impulse responses. We estimate a TVAR model with 2 lags (as per AIC). We
begin our analysis with specification test presented in Table 1.2 below. We reject the null
of linear VAR model against the alternative of two regimes one threshold VAR model8. The
endogenously estimated threshold defines our two regimes. For example, when output gap
falls below -1.84 the corresponding model is our bad state or recessionary state. When the
output gap is above threshold value of -1.84 the corresponding model is our good state or
expansionary state.
Estimated nonlinear impulse responses are presented below. We present the impulse re-
sponse for debt to GDP ratio to positive 1 standard deviation increase in budget deficits to
GDP ratio (see Figure 1.11). We again find the asymmetry presented earlier and we observe
the government debt to GDP ratio grow faster during a bad state (recession) as opposed to
a good state (expansion). With budget deficits to GDP ratio, we can again find conformity
to our findings presented earlier. Cyclically adjusted budget deficit to GDP ratio rise faster
during a good state (expansion) as oppose to a bad state (recession) with a +1 standard
deviation increase to the debt to GDP ratio. With respect to an increase in the output gap,
we can observe the counter-cyclical behavior for the debt to GDP ratio as well as for the
884.9% observation in the regime above the threshold and 15.1% are below the threshold.
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budget deficits to GDP ratio.
Table 1.2: Specification Test: Cyclically Adjusted Data
Model
Threshold
τ
H0: Linear VAR
Gross Budget
Deficit to GDP ratio
-1.84
53.44**
(0.01)
p-value in the parenthesis
Figure 1.11: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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When we explore the nonlinear impulse responses of the debt to GDP and cyclically
adjusted budget deficit to GDP ratios (see Figure 1.12) we again observe conformity to
our findings presented earlier. Both these variables indicate presence of counter-cyclical be-
haviour with asymmetry.
These robustness check conform to our findings presented int he previous section. The
observed asymmetry and counter-cyclicality conform to our earlier finding that government
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Figure 1.12: Response of Debt to GDP ratio
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prefers economic stabilization over fiscal balances and debts during recessions.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics between government debt and budget deficits in
the United States during recessions as well as expansions using quarterly data for the post-
World War II period. We employ the threshold VAR model and compute the nonlinear im-
pulse responses. The econometric specification test confirm the endogenous threshold VAR
is the correct specification against the linear VAR model. The estimated nonlinear impulse
responses during a bad state and a good state allow us to explore the dynamics between the
two in a more objective manner.
Nonlinear impulse response analysis for the good state and bad state comparisons show
that response of the government debt to GDP ratio to an increase in the budget deficit to
GDP ratio is asymmetric, and counter-cyclical to an increase in the output gap. The debt to
GDP ratio rises faster during a bad state (recession) as opposed to a good state (expansion).
These results imply policy makers chose economic stabilization over balancing the budget
during recessions. However, the response of budget deficits to GDP to an increase to govern-
ment debt to ratio is asymmetric, and counter-cyclical to an increase in the output gap. We
observe the budget deficits to GDP ratio to rise more during a good state (expansion) as op-
posed to a bad state (recession). We check the robustness of our findings using a time-series
of primary budget deficits cyclically adjusted for variations arising from automatic stabiliz-
ers, which conform to our earlier findings. The findings above provide important empirical
insight on governments choice of economic stabilization over fiscal balance during recessions
in the United States in the post- World War II period.
The adoption of expansionary fiscal policy during recessions is imperative for economic
stabilization. However, such a policy increases the national debt. According to our analysis,
we argue for deficit reduction during economic expansions as a policy recommendation.
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Chapter 2
Relationship between the monetary
base and the fiscal debt in the U.S.:
evidence from threshold cointegration
2.1 Introduction
Does fiscal policy influence the Feds choice of monetary policy strategy? Increasing govern-
ment debt could potentially influence discretionary monetary policy choices by the central
bank (Blake and Kirsanova, 2012; Dı´az-Gime´nez et al., 2008). Corsetti and Dedola (2014) ar-
gue that unconventional monetary policy- targeting monetary aggregates instead of inflation-
can act as a backstop for an economy facing default risk with sovereign debt crisis. Taylor
(1993) is considered as the point of reference in defining the Feds monetary policy strategy,
and a plethora of research has examined forward-looking as well as backward-looking ver-
sions of the rule. There are empirical studies that explore the presence of regimes in the U.S.
monetary policy by investigating how the Taylor rule evolves with the Fed Chairmans tenure
(Bae et al., 2012). Asymmetry in monetary policy is another aspect investigated extensively
in recent times (Cassou et al., 2012). Despite recurrent scrutiny from a variety of dimensions,
there is a lack of comprehensive consensus on how the Feds monetary policy strategy evolve.
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Fiscal debt, arising from budget deficits, is a likely contender to influence monetary policy.
The Feds open market operations involve purchase and sale of government issued securities,
which in turn affect the money supply through the high-powered money or the monetary
base. Empirical investigations grounded on the Taylor (1993) in analyzing monetary policy
strategy pay little or no attention to the possible nexus between the government debt and
monetary aggregates such as the monetary base. We can develop more insight on the Feds
monetary policy strategy by analyzing the relationship between monetary base and fiscal
debt.
Sims (2013) argues in favor of a potential linkage between monetary and fiscal policy,
but Mankiw (2016) argues that there is a dearth of empirical evidence. A fiscal expansion,
through a tax cut or increased spending (or both), may lead to budget deficits that sway
government debt. In the Taylor rule, the real federal funds rate reacts to deviations in
contemporaneous inflation from a target, and, deviations in real output from its long-run
potential level. But the rule does not specify any responsiveness to fiscal policy. Whereas
the Fed’s open market operations involve buying and selling of government issued securities.
Government debt could bind the central bank to pursue a monetary policy in an accommoda-
tive manner. Monetization of fiscal debt is one area that has been under public scrutiny from
the policy makers and economists alike (Thornton, 2010). Fiscal vulnerabilities arising from
high government debt is likely to create new and complex interactions between public debt
management and monetary policy (Blake and Kirsanova, 2012; Blommestein and Turner,
2011).
Empirical evidence of a long-run relationship or co-movement between fiscal debt and
monetary base can provide insight on how government debt becomes relevant to the Feds
monetary policy strategy. Figure 2.1 below illustrates a similar pattern in the log of U.S.
government debt to GDP and the log of monetary base to GDP ratios since 1947. We observe
both the ratios decline until the mid-1970s, and then start to rise again. Both these vari-
ables indicate a pattern showing a potential long-run relationship or co-movement between
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the two. In this paper, we investigate formally using statistical methods if there is a long-run
relationship between government debt and monetary base in the U.S. Since there is empirical
evidence that infers the presence of regimes in monetary policy, we explore the presence of a
long-run relationship while considering regimes or threshold (Bae et al., 2012; Cassou et al.,
2012; Sims and Zha, 2006). We use the threshold cointegration technique to investigate the
presence of a long-run relationship and estimate a threshold vector error-correction model
(TVECM henceforth) to understand the short-run dynamics. The presence of a long-run
relationship, established through formal statistical procedures, imply we can obtain the dis-
equilibriums or movements deviating away from the long-run relationship over time. We can
use these dis-equilibriums in a vector error-correction model to analyze the short-run move-
ments. Our contribution to the literature takes two forms. First, using monthly data from
1942 to 2015 we find evidence of a threshold long-run relationship between government debt
and monetary base and threshold cointegration in the U.S. Typical cointegration tests do
not detect the presence of this long-run relationship. Second, the short-run dynamics from
the TVECM shows no evidence of debt monetization by the Fed, and the fiscal authorities
adjust debt in the short-run. This implies that the federal government debt does not influ-
ence the Feds monetary policy choices in the U.S. Thus, we find no evidence of monetary
accommodation by the Fed implying independence or autonomy of the Fed.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: in Section 2.2 we discusses the literature;
Section 2.3 we outline the data and methodology; Section 4.4 discusses the results, and
Section 2.5 presents the conclusion.
30
Figure 2.1: Log of Monetary base to GDP and Government debt to GDP, 1947 to 2015
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2.2 Literature Review
Recently, there is renewed interest in the interaction between fiscal authority and the central
bank in the literature. There is a rich volume of theoretical papers discussing these interac-
tions as well as empirical papers investigating for evidence.
Sims (2013) argues that fiscal and monetary policy are intertwined, and interactions be-
tween the fiscal authority and the central bank are key in determining the price level for an
economy. Theoretical papers such as Leeper and Leith (2016) develop the theory of price-
level determination using jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy. They argue that, from
a theoretical perspective when the fiscal authorities adopt an active fiscal rule, the central
banks ability to control inflation depends on the maturity structure of the outstanding debt
and the nature of its policy response. A central bank, pursuing active monetary policy tar-
geting inflation, may find the inflation rate permanently deviating from the inflation target
in the face of a fiscal shock.
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Chen et al. (2015) allow both a monetary and fiscal policy described by rules and/or
optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. Building on models by Bianchi and
Ilut (2017), these authors use a Bayesian estimation method that finds that monetary and
fiscal policy are often in conflict. They compare different permutations of rule-based policy
to a time-consistent set of optimal policy regimes and argue that time-consistent optimal
policy rule offers a data-preferred description of fiscal and monetary policy relative to the
rule-based approach. In particular, the fiscal authority is a Stackelberg leader and the mone-
tary authority implements a time-consistent monetary policy with switches in their degree of
inflation conservatism. Corsetti and Dedola (2014) argue that the central bank can provide
a reinforcement which helps rule out a sovereign debt crisis with the formers purchase of
government debt as unconventional monetary policy, instead of the conventional monetary
policy regarding the choice on inflation. Using a monetary model similar to that of Calvo
(1988), two potential states of the economy (high output state and low output state), the
authors1 argue that a monetary backstop is a feasible option in situations with large govern-
ment debt and such a monetary backstop prevents high inflation.
Blommestein and Turner (2011) argue for the significance of a fiscal and monetary coor-
dination in the post-financial crisis era. Albeit there could be potential conflicts or tensions
between the debt managers and monetary policy makers. Blake and Kirsanova (2012) inves-
tigate the stabilization bias that arises in a model of monetary and fiscal policy stabilization
using linear-quadratic rational expectation model, where the monetary authority put higher
weight on inflation stabilization than the rest of the society. These authors find that if the
steady-state level of debt is high, then the monetary authority has to take an active part in
debt stabilization. Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2008) using a cash-in-advance production economy
analyze the implications for the optimal sequential design of monetary policy with nomi-
nal and indexed public debt. These authors argue that a Calvo (1988) model is by design
unable to show how debt, either nominal or indexed, can impact the choice of monetary
1In this paper authors considers both the monetary authority and fiscal authority are independent of each
other. Both authorities are benevolent maximizing the same objective function, consolidate their budget
constraints, but take their optimal decisions independently treating each others instruments as constant.
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policy. In the cash-in-advance production economy, the rational expectations equilibria for
an initial given level of outstanding debt, nominal debt is a burden on optimal monetary
policy. Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) examine the relations between monetary and fiscal
policies in the process of macroeconomic stabilization. These authors argue, based on their
alternative game situations, both fiscal and monetary authority prefer a Stackelberg to that
of a Nash game, and the fiscal authority becoming the Stackelberg leader.
In recent times, the theoretical macroeconomic literature discusses avenues for fiscal and
monetary policy coordination. But the question of whether there is empirical evidence of fis-
cal policy influencing monetary policy strategy? The empirical literature lacks a consensus.
Allen and Smith (1983) find a positive and significant impact of total Treasury borrowing
upon the growth of the monetary base, and they conclude there is evidence of monetary
accommodations in the U.S. These authors also argue for regimes in the monetary authori-
tys policy preference. Cebula (1988) finds the federal budget deficit does, in fact, exercise a
positive and significant impact upon the nominal Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bond rate,
thus report positive empirical evidence supporting a link between fiscal policy and monetary
policy. Darrat (1990) argues that the findings in Cebula (1988) are subject to methodolog-
ical error, and using Engle-Granger procedure of cointegration analysis refuted the above
finding. These studies again do not provide any conclusive evidence.
Devereux (2010) while analyzing the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in fight-
ing recessions argues that due to the zero lower bound on interest rates, governments used
deficit-financed spending increase, tax cuts and also directly increase the monetary base.
Given the liquidity trap at the zero lower bound government spending financed by deficits
may be far more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such an environment.
Monetary policies aimed at directly increasing monetary aggregates may be effective, even if
interest rates are unchanged. This study is indicative of coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy, however, it does not establish an empirical long run relationship. Glenn and
Samad (2012) explore a fiscal and monetary policy inter-relation and inflation over the long-
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run for the U.S. The authors do not find evidence of fiscal policy dominating monetary policy
and vice-versa. Choi and Holmes (2014) using a Markov regime-switching model in investi-
gating the relevance of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem for the relationship between the
budget deficit and the real interest rate. They find that the U.S. economy switches between
a Ricardian Equivalence regime characterized by an insignificant relationship between the
adjusted primary budget deficit and real long-term interest rate and a regime characterized
by a positive relationship. However, these studies do not provide empirical evidence of a
central bank accommodating fiscal debt using monetary aggregates such as the monetary
base.
Taylor (1993) specified a policy reaction function for the Fed where the real federal funds
rate varies to changes in the difference between inflation and the inflation target, and the out-
put gap. Bae et al. (2012) note that there are studies that investigate the backward-looking
as well as forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule, however, these studies lack consensus
regarding the nature, evolution, or even existence of monetary policy regime. Clarida et al.
(2000) find evidence that there are significant differences in the manner in which monetary
policy is conducted in pre- and post- 1979. Orphanides (2004) argues that results in Clarida
et al. (2000) should be considered with caution. Orphanides (2004) argues that the Fed uses
real-time data while determining the suitable monetary policy and do not use the ex-post
data. The author shows that the differences found in Clarida et al. (2000) disappears when
using real-time data. Primiceri (2005) finds evidence of time-variation in monetary policy;
however, finds little evidence of interest rate responding to high inflation and unemploy-
ment episodes. Sims and Zha (2006) argue that the Taylor rule (1993) could potentially
be misleading in explaining regimes in monetary policy as there could be episodes where
monetary policymakers were focusing on monetary aggregates instead. They use an SVAR
model that explicitly allows for changes in the policy regime, and report that the data is
best explained by a model with no changes at all in coefficients, either of the policy rule or
of the private sector block of the model. They find variance of the structural disturbances
change across regimes. Kim and Nelson (2006) find three separate regimes in US monetary
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policy in a time-varying model for forward-looking monetary policy rule. Bae et al. (2012)
employ a two-step MLE procedure to estimate a Markov-switching model to investigate a
forward-looking Taylor rule for monetary policy in which policy changes are non-recurrent
and monotonic but probabilistic. They find the presence of five regimes in the U.S. monetary
policy. There are studies which investigate asymmetry in monetary policy preference. Cas-
sou and Va´zquez (2014) consider a time-varying parameter extension of the (Ruge-Murcia,
2003, 2004) model to explore asymmetric preference of the Fed. Cassou et al. (2012) also
report similar asymmetry in the Feds preference using the Taylor rule (1993).
The theoretical literature discussed above indicates a fiscal and monetary coordination,
and/or accommodation of fiscal policy by the monetary authority, especially when fiscal
authorities face higher debt burden. There is a plethora of empirical research on the issue
of regimes and asymmetry in monetary policy strategy by the Fed. These studies use the
Taylor (1993) rule as their benchmark. The Taylor (1993) rule, given its specification, refers
to the Fed’s target. The research, using the Taylor (1993) rule, however, produce a varied
set of evidence. We do not find empirical studies that investigate the potential relationship
between the government debt and the monetary base while considering regimes in the policy
regime. Also, there is a dearth of empirical evidence if the Fed is accommodating government
debt through debt monetization in the short-run. This is one area that merits investigation
to fill-up the gap in the literature.
2.3 Data and Methodology
In this section, we discuss the data and methodology use in this essay. We are using monthly
data from 1942: 1 to 2015: 12 on government debt and monetary base of the U.S. The govern-
ment debt data series is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas2 and the monetary
base data is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. The GDP de-
2Federal Reserve Bank of Texas compiled the data from various issues of the US Treasury Bulletins.
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flator series are obtained from the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) tables.
We use the GDP deflator to convert the government debt and monetary base data into real
terms. The variables used in this essay are in their natural log, where LBt denote the natural
log of monetary base and LDt denote the natural log government debt. Figure 2.2 below
plots the data from 1942 to 2015. The plot shows that both the series move together over
time. Both figures 2.1 an 2.2 indicate the presence of a long-run relationship between the two.
Figure 2.2: Natural log of Monetary Base and Government Debt, 1942 to 2015
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There are three potential cases for cointegration or a long-run relationship between gov-
ernment debt and monetary base. First, there is no cointegration or no long-run relationship.
Second, there is cointegration or a long-run relationship. Finally, there could be threshold
cointegration or a threshold long-run relationship. In our empirical methodology we investi-
gate all three cases. As a pre-requisite to testing for cointegration between the two, we begin
our analysis by investigating non-stationarity or the presence of a unit root in the data. We
begin our analysis with simple unit root tests, namely augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981)
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and Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) tests. In the presence of a structural break various Dickey
and Fuller (1981) test statistics are biased toward non-rejection of a unit root and Phillips
and Ouliaris (1990) procedure assumes the date of the structural break is known (Enders,
2010). Plots of the data in Figure 2.2 indicate that both these series may have structural
breaks at unknown dates. Hence, we use the Lee and Strazicich (2003) and Lumsdaine and
Papell (1997) tests to investigate the stationarity property of the data. The Lee and Strazi-
cich (2003) test has two versions: the crash model investigates an abrupt change in the level,
and the break model allows for simultaneous changes in level and trend.
We then proceed to investigate if the two data series have cointegration or a long-run
relationship. Before describing the threshold model, we first discuss the simple non-threshold
cointegration model. The simple cointegrating relationship is given by:
LDt = βLBt + µt (2.1)
We use the Johansen (1991) procedure as well as the Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) tests
to investigate the presence of cointegration between the two variables. These procedures are
extensively described in other empirical papers, thus we do not discuss them in detail. In
general, the tests above assume the long-run relationship is invariant to time. We proceed
to test the presence of cointegration in a threshold model. The cointegration methodology
suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) involve estimation of equation (1) and testing if
the residual has a unit root or not. Since the augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) test on
the error-correction term µˆt from equation 1 do not consider potential nonlinearity in the
process, we run the following regression and conduct the RESET test.
∆µt = β0 + β1µˆt−1 + β2∆µˆt−1 + β3∆µˆ2t−1 + β4∆µˆ
3
t−1 + t (2.2)
In order to inspect the case for potential non-linearity, we perform the following test
H0 : β3 = β4 = 0. In addition, Pippenger and Goering (1993) and Balke and Fomby (1997)
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showed that tests of unit root have lower power in the presence of asymmetric adjustment.As
such, we consider a TAR structure for the error-correction term as follows:
∆µt = ρ1D(µˆt−1 − τ) + ρ2(1−D)(µˆt−1 − τ) +
l∑
i=1
γT,i∆µˆt−1 + υT,t (2.3)
In the above threshold regression, ρi and γT,i are the parameters of the model for i = 1, ..l
and υT,t is the error term with an added subscript to distinguish it from the non-threshold
error term. D is the dummy such that:
Dt =

1, if ∆µˆt−1 ≥ τ
0, if ∆µˆt−1 < τ
(2.4)
In this case τ represents the endogenously chosen threshold following the method by Chan
(1993). We arrange the endogenously chosen threshold variable in ascending order and trim
15% at the top and 15% at the bottom to avoid over-fitting. We estimate the model for
each value of the threshold variable and save the sum squared of residuals. We chose the
model with the lowest sum squared of residuals as our chosen model and the corresponding
value of the endogenous threshold variable as our threshold. As in the Engle and Granger
(1987) the lag length (l) typically is chosen by some type of information criterion so that
the model is well specified and the results in the γT,i being white noise. We will explore two
important aspects in the above structure. First, we will investigate the presence of threshold
cointegration. Second, we will test if the lag length is greater than 1 in the threshold model.
Testing for a threshold cointegration is explored by Enders and Siklos (2001). Enders and
Siklos (2001) describe two possible test statistics: H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 and H0 : ρi = 0, i = 1, 2.
The authors refer the first one as Φ∗ statistics and the second one as t − max statistics
respectively, and also note that the former has more power than the t − max statistics.
The null hypothesis H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 implies no cointegration between the variables, and
alternative implies the presence of threshold cointegration. As with the Engle and Granger
(1987) method, the test statistics do not have standard distributions for the Enders and
Siklos (2001) tests. They describe the methods for generating the proper critical values.
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Since the exact nature of non-linearity may be unknown, we use an M-TAR (momentum
TAR) with the threshold defined on µˆt−1 as well (Enders, 2010). M-TAR adjustments can
be especially useful when the policy makers are viewed as attempting to smooth out any
large changes in the series Enders and Siklos (2001). In addition, we will also use the Hansen
and Seo (2002) method to explore threshold cointegration. Hansen and Seo (2002) propose
two heteroscedasticity-consistent LM tests for the null of linear cointegration (i.e. there is
no threshold effect), against the alternative of threshold cointegration. The first test can be
used when the true cointegrating vector is known a priori, and is denoted by:
supLM0 = sup
γL≤γ≤γU
LM(β0, γ) (2.5)
where β0 is the known cointegrating vector. When the true cointegrating vector is un-
known we use the following, where β˜ is the null hypothesis estimate β.
supLM0 = sup
γL≤γ≤γU
LM(β˜0, γ) (2.6)
In both tests, [γL, γU ] is the search region set such that γL is the pi0 percentile of µˆt−1
and γU is the (1 − pi0) percentile of µˆt−1. Andrews (1994) suggest setting pi0 between 0.05
and 0.15, we use 0.15 in this paper. We proceed with the second test where the cointegrat-
ing vector is unknown, and employ parametric residual bootstrap procedures to approximate
the null distribution of the sup LM test and calculate asymptotic critical values and p-values.
Testing for whether the lag length is greater than 1 is important because this reveals
information relevant to the proper error-correction structure in the threshold vector error-
correction model (VECM) we will use this to explore the short-run dynamics. As noted by
Krishnakumar et al. (2009), if the lag length is only equal to 1, then the threshold structure
appears in the error-correction term only in the threshold VECM. While if the lag length is
greater than 1 the threshold structure extends to all the lagged dependent variables including
the error-correction term. One way to test this is to check whether a second lag improves
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the fit in the model described by equation 3.
Once the presence of threshold cointegration relationship is confirmed, we proceed to es-
timate the threshold VECM to analyze the short-run dynamics using either µˆt−1 or ∆µˆt−1as
the threshold variable. There are two alternative ways of estimating a threshold vector error
correction model (TVECM). We can estimate the TVECM either by considering the thresh-
old effect in the error correction term or we can estimate a model with a threshold effect in
all the dependent variables. We use the typical Akaike information criterion (AIC) to select
the appropriate lag lengths for the models described below.
The model below is the case where we consider threshold effect in all the lagged dependent
variables:
∆LDt = Dt[αd,1 + ρd,1µˆt−1 +
p∑
l=1
βd,1,d,l∆LDt−p +
p∑
l=1
βd,1,d,l∆LBt−p]+
(1−Dt)[αd,0 + ρd,0µˆt−1 +
p∑
l=1
βd,0,d,l∆LDt−p +
p∑
l=1
βd,0,d,l∆LBt−p] + εd,t
(2.7)
∆LBt = Dt[αb,1 + ρb,1µˆt−1 +
p∑
l=1
βb,1,d,l∆LDt−p +
p∑
l=1
βb,1,d,l∆LBt−p]+
(1−Dt)[αb,0 + ρb,0µˆt−1 +
p∑
l=1
βb,0,d,l∆LDt−p +
p∑
l=1
βb,0,d,l∆LBt−p] + εb,t
(2.8)
Dt =

1, if ∆µˆt−1 ≥ τ
0, if ∆µˆt−1 < τ
(2.9)
where αj,0, αj,1, ρj,1, ρj,0, βj,d,iandβj,b,i for j=d,b are the parameters of the model, l = 1, ..p
refer to the lag length and j,t are the error terms. In the specification above, the sub-
scripts make use of the following mnemonics. The first subscript indicates which equation
the parameter or error term is from, the second subscript in the ρj,1 and ρj,0 refer to the
dummy representing the state described earlier. The third and fourth subscripts attached
40
to the lagged difference term correspond to the type of variable that is differenced and the
lag length respectively.
We can alternatively compute the following model instead, where threshold effect is
observed only in the error correction term only and not on the other parameters:
∆LDt = αd + ρd,1Dtµˆt−1 + ρd,0(1−Dt)µˆt−1 +
p∑
l=1
βd,1,d,l∆LDt−p +
p∑
l=1
βd,1,d,l∆LBt−p + εd,t
(2.10)
∆LBt = αb+ρb,1Dtµˆt−1+ρb,0(1−Dt)µˆt−1+
p∑
l=1
βb,1,d,l∆LDt−p+
p∑
l=1
βb,1,d,l∆LBt−p+εd,t (2.11)
Dt =

1, if ∆µˆt−1 ≥ τ
0, if ∆µˆt−1 < τ
(2.12)
2.4 Results and Analysis
The following sub-sections summarize the estimation results starting with stationarity tests,
followed by the cointegration and the threshold cointegration tests. Finally, we present the
threshold VECM estimates.
2.4.1 Unit Root Test
We begin our analysis with stationarity tests. Figure 2.2 indicate the presence of potential
structural breaks in the data. We will pursue stationarity tests for known and unknown
structural break points in the data. Table 2.1 below furnishes the stationarity test results
using augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Perron (1989) tests on the level data. These
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results indicate both variables are non-stationary at levels as we can not reject the null of
unit root in the data 3. We note that the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics as well as
the Perron test statistics in the Table 2.1 indicate that intercept and trend are important in
the procedure. The trend and the intercept are prone to structural breaks. The power of the
tests presented below in Table 2.1 are susceptible to the presence of structural break, and
the Perron (1989) tests assume the date of the structural breaks are known Enders (2010).
Table 2.2 furnishes Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) and Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests which
allow us to test for stationarity with unknown structural breaks. These results also confirm4
that the variables are non-stationary or have a unit root at level.
Table 2.1: Unit Root Test: Level
Test LBt LDt
ADF Test: no Trend and Intercept 5.12 3.02
ADF Test: with Intercept 1.89 0.96
ADF Test: with Trend and Intercept -0.63 -2.60
Phillips-Perrron Test: with Intercept 2.21 -0.63
Phillips-Perrron Test: with Intercept and Trend -0.06 -1.36
Table 2.2: Unit Root Test: Unknown Structural Break
Test LBt LDt
Lumsdaine-Papell Test: Break in Intercept -2.92 -5.02
Lumsdaine-Papell Test: Break in Trend -5.59 -5.55
Lumsdaine-Papell Test: Break in both -5.60 -6.47
Lee-Strazizich Test: Crash Model -1.63 -3.18
Lee-Strazizich Test: Break Model –3.08 -3.27
Tables 2.3 below summarize the stationarity tests for both the variables in their first dif-
ferences. We use the variables in their natural log, thus we can interpret the first difference as
3ADF test 5% critical value are for no intercept and trend model -1.94, intercept only model -2.87, and
both intercept and trend model -3.42. Phillip Perron test 5% critical value are for intercept only model -2.87,
and both intercept and trend model -3.42.
4Lumsdaine-Papell Test 5% critical values are -6.16 for breaks in intercept, -6.62 for breaks in trend, and
-6.75 for break in both intercept and trend.
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their respective growth rates. We investigated the plot of the growth rates for both variables,
which do not indicate the presence of a trend in the first differences. Hence, we will not dis-
cuss the case for a trend in our analysis of stationarity presented below in Table 2.3. Results
for all the tests indicate the variables are stationary in their first difference5 i.e. they are I(1).
Table 2.3: Unit Root Test: First Difference
Test LBt LDt
ADF Test: no Trend and Intercept -5.67** -4.93**
Phillips-Perrron Test: with Intercept -15.20** -27.17**
Lumsdaine-Papell Test: Break in Intercept -8.81** -6.33**
Lee-Strazizich Test: Crash Model -3.81 -4.18
2.4.2 Cointegration and Threshold VECM
In order to investigate the presence of a long-run relationship or cointegration between the
two variables, we need them to be non-stationary at the level and be first order difference
stationary. Since our findings discussed above confirm that our variables are I(1), we can
proceed to test for cointegration or a long-run relationship between the two. The following
furnishes the results from the cointegration tests between the natural logs of debt and the
natural log monetary-base. Results in Table 2.4 display the Johansen (1991) and the Phillips
and Ouliaris (1990) procedures, which indicate that we cannot find evidence in support of
cointegration or a long-run relationship between the two6. We can not reject the null of no
cointegration for these test at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels for both these tests.
5ADF test 5% critical value is -1.93, Phillips Perron Test is -2.86, Lumsdaine-Papell test is -6.16.
6 Critical values are 14.90,and 8.18 for the Eigenvalue Test, and 17.95,and 8.18 for the Trace Test at 5%,
Critical values is 33.71 for PU , and s 55.22 PZ tests at 5%.
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Table 2.4: Cointegration Test
Johansen-Juselius (1990) Procedure
λmax λtrace
r ≤ 1 0.81 0.81
r = 0 8.15 8.96
Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) Procedure
Test type: PU : 6.67
Test type: PZ : 3.29
Since, the tests above do not confirm evidence of cointegration we proceed to investigate
for the presence of threshold cointegration. Following the Engle and Granger (1987) proce-
dure, in our first step, we compute the following long-run relationship as per equation 2.1
described earlier:
LDt = 1.37LBt + µt (2.13)
In the second step, we obtain the residuals µˆt and conduct unit root test on the residuals.
The residual have a unit root as per the Dickey and Fuller (1981) tests.This implies that there
is no evidence of cointegration between the two. The linear cointegration test may fail to
reject the null of no cointegration due to presence of possible nonlinearity in the adjustment.
Siklos and Granger (1997) and Balke and Fomby (1997) find evidence in favor of asymmetric
adjustment. We first conduct a RESET test (described in equation 2.2) and cannot reject the
null H0 : β3 = β4 = 0 for the linearity. This linearity test enables us to check for nonlinear
alternatives. Following the Enders and Granger (1998) threshold unit root we conduct the
threshold unit root test on the obtained residuals. In this test, we consider both TAR and
momentum-TAR (M-TAR) adjustments for the threshold variable. Results below, Table 2.5,
indicate that we can reject the case for unit root for momentum-TAR. The momentum-TAR
model with a lag length of 97 implies we should apply threshold effect in all the right hand
side variables in our threshold vector error-correction model. This result imply that the
residual is stationary with a threshold effect. We now proceed with the formal threshold
7 5% critical values are 6.12 for TAR model, and 5.54 for M-TAR model
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cointegration tests described earlier. Table 2.6 below presents the results for the Hansen and
Seo (2002) and Enders and Siklos (2001) tests. The Enders and Siklos (2001) test, as well
as the Hansen and Seo (2002) test, confirm threshold cointegration between the two8. The
corresponding threshold values for both these tests have the same sign and similar magnitude.
Table 2.5: Enders-Granger Threshold Unit Root test
Model Threshold Unit Root Lags
TAR Model 2.54 9
Momentum TAR Model 5.58** 9
Table 2.6: Threshold Cointegration Test
Test Test Statistic Threshold
Enders and Siklos Test (2002) 12.45** -0.0156
Hansen and Seo Test (2002) 32.45** -0.0659
The results presented above confirm the presence of threshold cointegration or a thresh-
old long-run relationship between the natural log of government debt and the natural log of
monetary-base in the U.S.
As discussed earlier, the evidence of a long-run relationship confirmed through formal
statistical procedure enables us to explore the short-run dynamics between the two. The
residuals from equation 2.1 provide us the disequilibriums or deviation away from the long-
run relationship. These residuals define our error-correction term. We use these residuals
in our threshold vector error-correction model (TVECM) to analyze the short-run dynamics
between the two. We use the first difference of the error-correction term as our endogenous
threshold variables to define the dummy for the TVECM model below.
8 5% critical value for the Enders and Siklos is 6.63, and Hansen and Seo is 31.60.
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Dt =

1, if ∆µˆt−1 ≥ −0.0152
0, if ∆µˆt−1 < −0.0152
(2.14)
As discussed earlier, we estimate equations 2.7 and 2.8, where the threshold effect is
applied to all the right-hand side variables. The Enders and Granger (1998) threshold Unit
root test uses a lag length of 9, and as per Krishnakumar et al. (2009), the above specification
is our preferred one. We will present and discuss the estimation output from the equations
2.10 and 2.11 as well to check the robustness of our findings. We will use a lag length of 3
as per AIC for the estimation using the full sample.
The results in Table 2.7 and 2.8 below present the lagged error-correction terms for both
growth in government debt (∆LDt) and growth in monetary-base (∆LBt) equations. Table
2.7 present the case where threshold effect is applied to all the right-hand side variables, and
Table 2.8 present the case where threshold effect is applied to the error-correction term only.
For the purpose of brevity as well as for relevance we will present and discuss part of the
estimation output with the error-correction terms9. The results indicate that government
adjusts their debt whenever the error correction term deviates from the long-run equilib-
rium and the Fed does not accommodate debt. We denote the periods where the difference
in the error correction terms are above the threshold as regime 1 (∆ECTt−1 = ∆LDt−1 −
1.3745∆LBt−1 − 0.0152). Regime 2 refer to the periods when the difference in the error
correction term are below the threshold (∆ECTt−1 = ∆LDt−1− 1.3745∆LBt−1 < −0.0152).
In regime 1, when government debt growth is larger than the growth in monetary-base, we
observe that the government reduce debt growth as the speed of adjustment has a value of
-0.002 (the coefficient of the lagged error-correction term). It is statistically significant as
well. The Fed, on the other hand, reduces growth in monetary-base. The speed of adjust-
ment parameter has a value of -0.0005, but it is not statistically significant. Though it is
not significant, the sign implies that the Fed tightens the base instead of accommodating
9The complete estimation output is presented at the appendix.
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the debt growth. We find similar results when we consider threshold effect in the error-
correction term only presented in Table 2.8. In regime 2, when government debt growth is
smaller than the growth in monetary-base, we observe that the government increase debt
growth as the speed of adjustment has a value of 0.007 (the coefficient of the lagged error-
correction term). It is statistically significant as well. The Fed, on the other hand, increase
growth in monetary-base. The speed of adjustment parameter has a value of 0.005, but it is
not statistically significant.We find similar results when we consider threshold effect in the
error-correction term only presented in Table 2.8.
Table 2.7: TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in All)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.37∆LBt−1) ≥ −0.0152
∆LDt ∆LDt
ECTHt−1
-0.002**
(0.003)
-0.0005
(0.001)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.37∆LBt−1) < −0.0152
ECTLt−1
0.007**
(0.002)
0.005
(0.004)
Notes: 1. Eicker-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard error
2. Approximately 84.72% observation in higher regime, and
15.28% in lower regime.
Table 2.8: TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in the ECT only)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.37∆LBt−1) ≥ −0.0152
∆LDt ∆LDt
ECTHt−1
-0.002**
(0.0008)
-0.002
(0.001)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.37∆LBt−1) < −0.0152
ECTLt−1
0.007**
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
Notes: 1. Eicker-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard error
2. Approximately 84.72% observation in higher regime, and
15.28% in lower regime.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 plots the first difference in the error correction term and the threshold,
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where we have two regimes: above and below the threshold. The shaded areas represent the
National Bureau of Economic Research recession dates. For the purpose of visual inspection,
we split the figure into two time periods: 10 1942:1 to 1976:12 and 1977:1 to 2015:12. We
observe the frequency at which regime 2 (below the threshold) appear is relatively fewer
times until 1976. With rising debt to GDP starts in the subsequent period, we observe
the frequency of regime 2 increases substantially. The magnitude of the variation in the
difference in the error-correction terms in visibly more during this period. But, we do not
find a systemic pattern with the recessions. As per figures 2.3 and 2.4, we observe a lot of
volatility and regime-switching appearing during the World War II years and post-financial
crisis years. The period from post-World War II to the early part of the 1970s, we observe
regime 1 more prevalent, where the scale of the first difference in the error correction term
indicates relatively lesser volatility. As in figure 2.1, we observe that during this period debt
to GDP ratio in the U.S. has been steadily falling. Starting from the early 1980s we start
observing the scale in the first difference in the error correction term show relatively more
volatility. During this era, we also observe the frequency at which regime 2 appears increase
relative more. As in figure 2.1, we also observe the debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. start to
rise again after about four decades. Arestis et al. (2004) also find the presence of regimes
with the federal budget deficits and report similar findings for the U.S.
Based on the results discussed above, we find no evidence of the Fed accommodating
government debt or debt financing. These findings remain consistent with both the specifi-
cations in the threshold structure. Figure 2.3 and 2.4, we observe there are a lot of volatility
in during the World War II periods and post-financial crisis years. The prevalence of regime
2 during the period from 1946 to 1966 are relatively few and mostly coincide with recessions.
The frequency at which regime 2 appear is much higher since the early 1970s. They also
appear during the first part of Volckers tenure as the Fed Chair. We also observe the regime
2 to appear in periods on or after recessions.
101977 onwards we observe the debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. starts to rise again after almost three decades
of continuous decline.
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Figure 2.3: Difference in Error Correction Term, Recessions, and Threshold, 1942-1976
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Figure 2.4: Difference in Error Correction Term, Recessions, and Threshold, 1977-2015
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2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we proceed to check the validity of our findings over two sub-samples. The
full sample ranges from 1942 to 2015, which include World War II years and the financial
crisis years. The findings presented earlier are likely to have influence from these two events.
We observed a lot of volatility in the first difference of the error-correction term (see Figures
2.3 and 2.4). Government budget deficits and subsequent rise in debt were necessitated due
to some special circumstances. Hence, it is imperative to investigate the sensitivity of our
results and findings over sub-samples. As such we create two sub-samples: sub-sample 1
comprises of data from 1946 to 2015, and sub-sample 2 comprises of data from 1946 to 2007.
The results below present and discuss the threshold cointegration and threshold VECM re-
sults for these two sub-samples.
Table 9 below present the Ender and Granger Threshold Unit Root Test. We can reject
the presence of a unit root for the sub-sample 1 but not for the sub-sample 211. On the
other hand, the formal threshold cointegration tests in Table 10, indicate there is evidence
of threshold cointegration between the natural log of government debt and the natural log
of monetary-base in both the sub-samples12.
The estimation output of the threshold vector error correction model for sub-sample 1 has
the same findings as the full sample. We observe the government to adjust debt growth but
no evidence of monetary authority adjusting monetary-base. However, estimation output of
the threshold vector error correction model for sub-sample 2 gives findings which differ from
the full sample as well as sub-sample 1.
115% critical values are 6.12 for TAR model, and 5.54 for M-TAR model.
12The Enders and Siklos test 5% critical value is 6.63, and the Hansen and Seo critical values are 31.32
and 32.37.
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Table 2.9: Threshold Unit Root Test: Sub-samples
Sub-sample: 1946 to 2015
Model Threshold Unit Root Test Lags
TAR 2.88 15
Momentum TAR 8.13** 15
Sub-sample: 1946 to 2007
TAR 2.80 15
Momentum TAR 1.95 15
Table 2.10: Threshold Cointegration Test: Sub-samples
Threshold Cointegration Test Test Statistic Threshold
Sub-sample: 1946 to 2015
Enders and Siklos Test (2002) 14.10** -0.0146
Hansen and Seo Test (2002) 59.57** -0.0116
Sub-sample: 1946 to 2007
Enders and Siklos Test (2002) 9.27** 0.0108
Hansen and Seo Test (2002) 62.37** -0.2528
The results in Table 2.11 and 2.12 below present the lagged error-correction terms for
both growth in government debt (∆LDt) and growth in monetary-base (∆LBt) equations.
Table 2.11 present the case where threshold effect is applied to all the right-hand side vari-
ables, and Table 2.12 present the case where threshold effect is applied to the error-correction
term only. For the purpose of brevity as well as for relevance we will present and discuss
part of the estimation output with the error-correction terms13.The results indicate that
government adjusts their debt whenever the error correction term deviates from the long-
run equilibrium and the Fed does not accommodate debt. We denote the periods where the
difference in the error correction terms are above the threshold as regime 1 (∆ECTt−1 =
∆LDt−1−1.42∆LBt−1−0.0106). Regime 2 refer to the periods when the difference in the er-
ror correction term are below the threshold (∆ECTt−1 = ∆LDt−1−1.42∆LBt−1 < −0.0106).
13The complete estimation output is presented in Appendix C.
51
Table 2.11: TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in All)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.42∆LBt−1) ≥ −0.0106
∆LDt ∆LDt
ECTHt−1
-0.003**
(0.001)
-0.002**
(0.0009)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.42∆LBt−1) < −0.0106
ECTLt−1
0.009**
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
Notes: 1. Eicker-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard error
2. Approximately 77.78% observation in higher regime, and
22.22% in lower regime.
Table 2.12: TVECM: Error Correction Term (Threshold effect in the ECT only)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.42∆LBt−1) ≥ −0.0152
∆LDt ∆LDt
ECTHt−1
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001*(0.0009)
∆ECTt−1 = (∆LDt−1 − 1.42∆LBt−1) < −0.0152
ECTLt−1
0.007**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
Notes: 1. Eicker-White heteroskedasticity consistent standard error,
2. Approximately 77.78% observation in higher regime, and
22.22% in lower regime.
In regime 1, when government debt growth is larger than the growth in monetary-base, we
observe that the government reduce debt growth as the speed of adjustment has a value of
-0.003 (the coefficient of the lagged error-correction term). It is statistically significant as
well. The Fed, on the other hand, reduces growth in monetary-base. The speed of adjustment
parameter has a value of -0.002, which is statistically significant. The sign implies that the
Fed tightens the monetary base instead of accommodating the debt growth. We find similar
results when we consider threshold effect in the error-correction term only presented in Table
2.8. In regime 2, when government debt growth is smaller than the growth in monetary-base,
we observe that the government increase debt growth as the speed of adjustment has a value
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of 0.009 (the coefficient of the lagged error-correction term). It is statistically significant as
well. The Fed, on the other hand, increase growth in monetary-base. The speed of adjust-
ment parameter has a value of 0.001, but it is not statistically significant. We find similar
results when we consider threshold effect in the error-correction term only presented in Table
2.12.
The sensitivity analysis using two sub-samples again conform to our findings for the full
sample. We find formal statistical evidence supporting the presence of a threshold long-run
relationship between the natural log of government debt and the natural log of monetary
base. Threshold VECM models show that in the short-run government adjust the debt and
there is no evidence of accommodation by the Fed or debt monetization.
2.5 Conclusion
Empirical evidence of fiscal policy influencing monetary policy is scarce, even though theoret-
ical papers in the literature in recent times consider such cases. In this paper, we investigate
to find formal statistical evidence of a long-run relationship between the monetary-base and
government debt using monthly data from 1942:1 to 2015:12 for the U.S. in an attempt to
find empirical evidence of fiscal policy influencing monetary policy.
The linear cointegration procedures fail to detect evidence of a long-run relationship.
However, threshold cointegration procedures developed by Enders and Siklos (2001) and
Hansen and Seo (2002) find evidence in favor of a threshold long-run relationship between
the government debt and the monetary-base in the U.S. In addition to the full sample, we
use two sub-sample to investigate if the evidence for the threshold long-run relationship or
threshold cointegration are sensitive to sample periods, excluding the World War II and
financial crisis years. As one can argue that the long-run relationship is a more recent phe-
nomenon. We find evidence of a long-run relationship in both cases. As for the short-run
dynamics using the threshold vector error correction model postulate that the monetary-base
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do not adjust to changes in the government debt in any of the regimes. Rather the fiscal
authorities adjust debt level in both regimes. Thus showing no evidence of regime-based
monetary accommodation to fiscal debt in the U.S. These findings remain consistent over
the sub-samples. The sample excluding the World War II and financial crisis era indicate at
times of rapid growth in the government debt, the Fed tightens the monetary-base growth.
We do not find evidence of debt monetization in the U.S. Thus, the findings above reinforcing
the argument in favor or independent or autonomous Fed.
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Chapter 3
Response of short-run interest rate
and inflation to budget deficits and
money supply: A nonlinear approach
3.1 Introduction
In theory, an increase in budget deficits leads to a rise in interest rate as the supply of
loanable funds fall given demand. A monetary expansion, on the hand, leads to a fall in the
interest rate. During recessions, we observe budget deficit to increases due to expansionary
fiscal policy, and central banks adopt an expansionary monetary policy. Movement of real
interest rate with budget deficits and monetary policy is integral to contemporary macroe-
conomic discourse. Theory relate these two in explaining the goods market as well as the
money market outcomes, and also we use them to predict outcomes of policy intervention.
Business cycle necessitates macroeconomic policy interventions, and, both monetary and
fiscal policies impact inflation and interest rate. In assessing success (or failure) of a policy
intervention, economists often refer to the behavior of economic agents. Economic agents
decision on labor supply and consumption, and, their expectation formation subsequently
impact their resource allocation decisions. In theory, these decisions are linked to inflation
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and interest rate for optimizing economic agents.
Macroeconomic impact of the budget deficits is an area of concern for academics as well
as for policy makers. Budget deficits, arising either from tax cuts or increased government
purchases, vary with the business cycle, and the Great Recession made the budget deficits
the core of a heated political debate. Analyzing the likely impact of the budget deficits on
inflation and the short-run interest rate is thus imperative. Similarly, theory relates money
supply directly to inflation and short-run interest rates, and it is very common to observe
monetary policy interventions precede fiscal policy. Analyzing the potential impact of the
budget deficits on inflation and interest without considering money supply will lead to erro-
neous conclusions (Laubach, 2009).
U.S. data on inflation and short-run interest rates exhibit variability with the business
cycle, thus are likely to respond in an asymmetric manner to fiscal deficit and money supply
(see Figures 1 and 2). We may also discover cyclicality (or counter-cyclical behavior) in their
behavior. Policy makers use both expansionary fiscal policy and monetary policy to stabilize
the economy during a recession. We also observe the use of contractionary monetary policy
during economic expansions. As such, the use of macroeconomic stabilization policy has
a nonlinear dimension in their implementation corresponding to the state of the economy.
We also observe a simultaneous nature in the use of such policies during recessions, usually,
monetary policy precedes fiscal policy. Use of expansionary fiscal policy often leads to larger
budget deficits. We also observe variations in the growth of money supply during recessions
as part of the expansionary monetary policy. This paper intends to explore the dynamics
between inflation and short-term interest rate with respect to a change in budget deficits
and money supply during a recession as opposed to an expansion. The principal contribu-
tions of this paper are as follows: (1) in this paper, we investigate the impact of growth in
budget deficits and money supply on inflation and short-term interest rate in the presence of
business cycles. We will use a threshold VAR model to incorporate business cycle into our
econometric specification. (2) The movement in inflation and short-term interest rate allow
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us to infer potential movement of real interest in an asymmetric framework, and (3) the
sample period in our analysis includes the financial crisis, thus giving us a more up-to-date
analysis. Our results indicate both inflation and short-term interest rate exhibit asymmetry
as well as cyclicality. Time path for real interest (inferred from the movements of inflation
and short-term interest rates) is also indicative of asymmetry.
Figure 3.1: Inflation and Short-term Interest Rate in the U.S.
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Note: 1. Quarterly data, 1959:Q1 to 2015:Q3
2. We use CPI to measure inflation and 3 month Treasury bill rate as a measure of short-term interest rate 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the relevant litera-
ture, Section 3.3 elaborates the data and methodology, Section 3.4 presents the results and
analysis, and finally Section 3.5 present the conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
We can find a plethora of empirical literature investigating the impact the budget deficits on
the interest rate. Most of the studies use a measure of real interest rate or use the Treasury
bill rates in their time series econometric specification to explore the relationship, and the
57
Figure 3.2: Growth in Money Supply and Budget Deficit in the U.S.
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findings are often contradictory in nature. There are studies that explore the impact of
monetary policy on real interest rates. It is worth noting that there is a gap in empirical
literature where the impact on real interest rate is explored while considering the budget
deficits and money supply together in the econometric specification.
In a simple Keynesian framework, an increase in government spending increases interest
rates, leading to a reduction in private spending through the crowding-out effect. Contrary
to the conventional Keynesian view, the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis suggests
that fiscal contractions can, through their impact on expectations, lead to growth in con-
sumption and investment. In this hypothesis, a large or persistent fiscal contraction follows
a previous expansionary fiscal stance, and signal the governments adjustment that has been
delayed Barry and Devereux (1995); Perotti (1999); Sutherland (1997). Alesina and Perotti
(1997) using cross-country data find evidence of such episodic fiscal contractions are more
likely to happen in the economies that need a fiscal adjustment. In a neoclassical framework,
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the effects of government spending stem mainly from its crowding-out effect and a wealth
effect. The wealth effect arises because increases in government spending today imply in-
creases in future taxes to balance the budget or reduce the deficit. The resulting fall in
wealth reduces consumer demand, increases labor supply, and lowers interest rates Barry
and Devereux (1995); Devereux and Love (1995), and the increase in labor supply, in turn,
increases the marginal productivity of capital and spur investment Burnside et al. (2004);
Ramey and Shapiro (1998). The size of the wealth effect depends on whether the change
in government spending has purely transitory or persistent effects. A common theme that
arises from the aforementioned literature- budget deficits are a significant aspect.
Makin (1983) uses quarterly data from 1959 to 1981 for 3 month Treasury bill finds
limited or no evidence of an increase in the interest rate due to the budget deficits.Wachtel
and Young (1987) report the existence of an empirical link between interest rates and future
budget deficits.Evans (1987) on the other hand, finds no evidence of budget deficits causing
interest rates to rise using three statistical techniques and argue that Ricardian equiva-
lence may explain as to why larger budget deficits are not associated with higher interest
rates.Mankiw (1987) argue that an increase in government spending depresses the real inter-
est rate because wealth effect reduces private consumption and increases the marginal utility
of consumption. This, in turn, lowers the marginal rate of substitution and thus marginal
productivity of capital.Engen and Hubbard (2004) explore the impact of the government
debt and the budget deficit on 10 year Treasury bill rate using U.S. data from 1953 to 2004
using a structural VAR framework. Their impulse responses indicate debt and budget deficit
increases the long-term interest rate measured with 10 year Treasury bill rate.Terzi (2007)
finds no evidence of any linkage between the budget deficit and interest rate for the U.S.
and Europe.Laubach (2009) finds interest rate to rise with government debt and budget
deficits. This study shows that statistically significant and economically plausible estimates
of the effects of budget deficits and debt on interest rates can be obtained by focusing on
long-horizon forward rates and projections of the budget deficits or debt.
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Choi (1999) finds that interest rate response to money supply shock varies with the
state of the monetary policy stance. In this study author defines three states in monetary
policy- tight, loose and neutral, based on an estimated policy stance index. Threshold VAR
estimates suggest liquidity and expected inflation effect vary across states, where liquidity
effect is dominant in the loose and neutral states but a reversed liquidity effect in a tight
regime.Choi and Devereux (2006) explore the asymmetric effect of government spending and
as to how the real interest rate is relevant. They find the effect of fiscal policy depend on
the level of real interest rates since Ricardian Equivalence effect is smaller at lower financing
costs of the fiscal policy.Choi and Holmes (2014) investigate the relevance of Ricardian equiv-
alence in explaining the relationship between the budget deficit and real interest rate using
two centuries of annual U.S. data. They estimate a Markov regime-switching model that
shows that the U.S. economy switches between Ricardian equivalence regime, characterized
by an insignificant relationship between adjusted primary budget deficit and real long-term
interest rates, and a regime characterized by the traditional view of a positive relationship.
There are panel data studies which investigate the impact of budget deficits on infla-
tion in a cross-country setup.Dwyer (1982) report a lack of evidence that higher current or
past budget deficits lead to inflation. Recent analyses of cross-country data suggest that
the positive association between fiscal deficits and inflation is strong among high-inflation
and developing countries but not among low-inflation and industrial economies (Catao and
Terrones, 2005; Fischer et al., 2002).
Lack of consensus could potentially arise from governments asymmetric policy preference.
Choi (1999) and Choi and Holmes (2014) address the non-linearity by using threshold VAR
and Markov regime-switching model. But a key gap arises as none of the earlier studies
consider the budget deficits and money supply together in their empirical framework. In
addition, the financial crisis era is characterized by substantial changes in both fiscal and
monetary policy actions. We observed a rapid rise in the budget deficits on the fiscal side.
Short-term Interest rate stayed at the zero lower bound and the Fed also adopted quantita-
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tive easing. We employ a regime switching threshold VAR to investigate as to how money
supply and budget deficit influence short-run interest rate and inflation.
3.3 Data and Methodology
In this paper, we use U.S. quarterly data from 1959: Q2 to 2015: Q3 on inflation, interest
rate, the percentage change in the budget deficit and percentage change in money supply.
Real GDP, deflator, and government spending and receipt data are collected from the Na-
tional Income and Product Account (NIPA) tables. The money supply and the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) data are collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database.
All the variables used in this paper are in their natural log.
We use the following definitions for measuring deficit (Abel et al., 2014). Primary deficit
and primary current deficit shows by how much government receipts fall short of the spending
outlays.
• Gross Deficit = Government Outlays - Government Receipts = (Government Purchase
+ Transfer and Subsidies +Net Interest Payment) - Government Receipts
• Current Deficit = (Gross Deficit + Government Investment Expenditure) - Government
Receipts
• Primary Current Deficit = Current Deficit - Net Interest Payment
We will estimate a 5 variable endogenous threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) model
with the output gap as our endogenous threshold variable. There are different ways to mea-
sure the output gap in the existing literature. For example, one can use the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). However, Mise et al. (2005) argue that such fil-
ters are not adequate to fully capture the output gap as the HP filter produces series with
spurious dynamic relations that have no basis in the underlying data-generating process.
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Following Cassou et al. (2015) output gap is defined as the deviation of the observed an-
nual output growth rate from its long-term average. For the output gap, we computed the
difference between the observed annual growth rate and the average growth rate over the
sample period of 1959 to 2015. In particular, we computed the growth rate in percentage
terms by multiplying 100 times the log difference between the current value of real GDP and
the value four quarters earlier. Next, these growth rates were averaged and then the average
was subtracted from the annual growth rate series to give a series that has positive values
when the current growth rate exceeds the average and negative values when the growth rate
is below the average.
In this paper, the endogenous threshold VAR is estimated following the method proposed
by Tsay (1998) and Lo and Zivot (2001). Authors’ generalize the univariate and single
equation estimations by Tong (1990),Chan (1993) and Hansen (1996) for a multivariate
VAR.We will use an endogenous threshold VAR (TVAR) model and compute the nonlinear
impulse responses to explore the dynamics between debt and deficit. Why endogenous
threshold VAR? Afonso et al. (2011) note that the endogenous TVAR model has a number
of interesting features. First, it is a relatively simple way to capture possible nonlinearities
such as asymmetric reactions to shocks or the existence of multiple equilibria. As the effects
of the shocks are allowed to depend on the size and the sign of the shock, and also on the
initial conditions, the impulse response functions are no longer linear, and it is possible to
distinguish, for instance, between the effects of fiscal developments under different economic
states. Second, another advantage of the TVAR methodology is that the variable by which
different regimes are defined itself is an endogenous variable included in the VAR. Therefore,
this makes it possible that regime switches may occur after the shock to each variable. In
particular, the fiscal policy shock might either boost the output or increase the budget deficit
that harms the prospects of economic growth, and the overall effect to the economy of a fiscal
expansion might become negative. We can write an endogenous threshold VAR (of lag order
order p) specified in the following manner. We will use the Akaike Information Criteria
(AIC) to select the appropriate lag lengths.
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where Inft is inflation rate at time t, Intt is interest rate at time t, ∆Deft is growth in
budget deficit at time t, and ∆MSt is growth in money supply at time t, and Y Gt is the
measure of the output gap at time t. αj, βj, γj, δj and θj are the parameters of the model,
and p represent the lag length selected using the information criterion. The output gap
variable is our endogenous threshold variable such that:
It =

1, if Y Gt−d ≤ τ
0, if Y Gt−d > τ
(3.6)
It is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when output gap Y Gt−d is less than
or equal to the threshold , and 0 otherwise. The time lag for the output gap is set to 1
(d=1). We arrange the output gap variable in a ascending order and trim the top 15% and
the bottom 15% in order to avoid over-fitting. We compute a VAR model for each of the
output gap values and obtain the sum-squared of the residuals. We chose the output gap
corresponding to the lowest sum-squared of the residuals as our threshold and the corre-
sponding model as our threshold VAR model. We interpret the model below the threshold
as bad state, which is assumed to be the state of recession. The model above the threshold
is interpreted as good state, which we assume to be the state of expansion.
We conduct specification test of linear VAR model against nonlinear alternative. The
threshold value is not known a priori and the testing procedure involves non-standard infer-
ence, because τ is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold. Therefore, first,
the TVAR model is estimated for all possible values of τ , (to avoid over-fitting, the possible
values were set so that at least 15% of the observations). This test is the multivariate ex-
tension proposed by Lo and Zivot (2001) of the linearity test of Hansen (1996). Instead of a
F-test comparing the SSR for the univariate case, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test comparing
the covariance matrix of each model is computed.
LRij = T
[
ln(det
∑ˆ
i
)− ln(det
∑ˆ
j
)
]
(3.7)
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where
∑ˆ
i is the estimated covariance matrix of the model with i regimes(e.g. i=1 imply an
one threshold regime).We test a linear model against 1 threshold alternative.
In a linear model, the impulse responses can be derived directly from the estimated
coefficients and the estimated responses are symmetric both in terms of the sign and of the
size of the structural shocks. Furthermore, these impulse responses are constant over time as
the covariance structure does not change. However, these convenient properties do not hold
within the class of nonlinear models as shown by Koop et al. (1996). The moving average
representation of the TVAR is nonlinear in the structural disturbances, because some shocks
may lead to switches between regimes, and thus their Wold decomposition does not exist.
Consequently, in contrast to linear models, we cannot construct the impulse responses as
the paths the variables follow after an initial shock, assuming that no other shock hits the
system. To cope with these issues, Koop et al. (1996) proposed nonlinear impulse response
functions defined as the difference between the forecasted paths of variables with and without
a shock to a variable of interest. Formally, the nonlinear impulse responses functions (NIRF)
are defined as:
NIRFY (k, t,Ωt−1) = E(Yt+k|t,Ωt−1)− E(Yt+k|Ωt−1) (3.8)
where Yt+k is a vector of forecasts at horizon k, Ωt−1 is the available information set, and
t is the shock at time t.The following discussion draws on from Afonso et al. (2011). This
formulation implies that the impulse response functions depend on the initial conditions and
that there is no restriction regarding the symmetry of the shocks. Therefore, in order to get
the complete information about the dynamics of the model, the impulse responses have to be
simulated for various sizes and for the signs of the shocks. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
First, the shocks for the periods from 0 to q are drawn from the residuals of the estimated
VAR model. Then, for each initial value that is, for each point of our sample, this sequence of
shocks is fed through the model to produce forecasts conditional on initial conditions. These
steps are repeated for the same initial condition and the same set of residuals except for the
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shock to the variable of interest, which is set to (+/-) 1 standard error and (+/-) 2 standard
errors at time 0. Second, we can calculate the forecasts conditional on the shocks and on the
initial conditions with and without an additional shock at t = 0, and the difference between
these two is the impulse response function. This procedure is replicated 500-times for each
initial condition, and then we compute averages over the initial conditions from each regime
to get the average impulse responses for both regimes. Using these forecasts, we compute
the time path for real interest rate following the Fishers equation:
rjt = i
j
t − pijt+1 (3.9)
where r, i and pi represent real interest rate, short-term interest rate and inflation rate re-
spectively. The subscript j = good or badstate, superscript t represent forecast horizon.
3.4 Results and Analysis
We compute a threshold VAR with 1 lag, where the optimal lag length is selected based
on AIC. We proceed with the specification test based on likelihood ratio as per Lo and
Zivot (2001) described earlier. Table 3.1 below presents the likelihood ratio test where we
reject the null of the linear model against threshold VAR. Based on the threshold VAR, with
the threshold is defined at -2.0731. The endogenously estimated threshold defines our two
regimes. For example, when the output gap falls below -2.073 the corresponding model is
our bad state or recessionary state. When the output gap is above the threshold value of
-2.073 the corresponding model is our good state or expansionary state. Using the TVAR
and the threshold, we proceed to compute the generalized impulse responses. We compute
nonlinear impulse responses for +1, +2, -1 and -2 standard deviation change in the variables.
For brevity, we will present the impulse responses for +1 standard deviation increase for the
good and the bad states. We derive the real interest rate for the two states of the economy
1We have 12.4% observations in the regime below the threshold, and 87.6% observations above the
threshold.
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using equation 3.9 discussed earlier.
Table 3.1: Specification Test
Model
Threshold
τ
H0: Linear VAR
Threshold VAR -2.07
250.88***
(0.00)
Note: 1. p-value in the parenthesis
2. Boot strap critical values are 118.50 for 90%, 129.83 for 95%,
and 138.90 for 99%.
We estimate nonlinear impulse response for two states- a good state and a bad state as
per out threshold VAR models. These impulse responses present us a visual comparison of
how one variable is behaving over the forecast horizon with respect to an increase in the
other during good state and bad state. Figure 3.3 below shows the 15 quarter ahead nonlin-
ear impulse responses of inflation and short-term interest rate with a +1 standard deviation
increase to growth in money supply. We observe both inflation and 3-month Treasury bill
interest rate responds after one-quarter and show asymmetry. Inflation rises relatively faster
in the good state as opposed to the bad state. The low aggregate demand in the bad state
perhaps plays an important role. The 3-month Treasury bill rates keep rising in the good
state. However, in the bad state, it reduces initially but after 5 quarters it starts to rise
again. When we combine the inflation and short-run interest rates to explore the dynamics
in real interest rate, we observe real interest rate also behave in an asymmetric manner (see
figure 3.4 below). The growth in money supply lower real interest rate in the bad state, which
remains negative for about 8 quarters. Though it becomes positive afterward but remains
very low. During the good state, we observe the real interest to remain negative for about 4
quarters. But it keeps rising eventually becoming positive after 4 quarters. In analyzing the
behavior of the real interest rate during a bad state (recession) and a good state (expansion)
we will refer to the liquidity effect, price-level effect and expected inflation effects.2 In the
2Please refer to Chapter 5, Mishkin, F.S. (2014). Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets,
11th Ed., Pearson for discussion on income, price-level and expected-inflation effect
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good state, the liquidity effect is dominant for about a year. But the expected inflation
and the price-level effects become relatively more dominant causing real interest rate to rise
faster afterward. In the bad state, on the other hand, the liquidity effect is dominant for
about 5 quarters pushing the interest rate lower. But beyond that the expected inflation
and price-level effects start to dominate more than liquidity effect, thus, the real interest
rate starts rising.
Figure 3.3: Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to growth in Money Supply
+1 Standard Deviation increase in Growth in Money Supply
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Figure 3.5 below shows the 15 quarter ahead nonlinear impulse responses for inflation
and short-term interest rate with +1 standard deviation increase in the growth in the bud-
get deficit. We can find that both inflation and 3-month Treasury bill interest rate responds
after one-quarter and display asymmetry. We observe that the inflation rate rises faster in
the good state, whereas we observe deflation in the bad state. Conceivably increased deficit
causes a larger decline in aggregate demand through a decline in consumption (a negative
wealth effect) in the bad state. Although, after 10 quarters the increase in budget deficit
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Figure 3.4: Time path for Real Interest Rate
Case: Growth in Money Supply 
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cause deflation in the good state. The short-run interest rate measured by the 3-month Trea-
sury bill rates falls throughout the forecast horizon in the bad state. However, in the good
state, it rises initially but after 2 quarters it starts to fall throughout the forecast horizon.
When we combine the inflation and short-run interest rates to explore the dynamics of the
real interest rate, we observe real interest rate also behave in an asymmetric manner. An
increase in the budget deficits in the good states keeps the real interest rate negative. During
the bad state, the real interest rate remains positive for about 5 quarter, then gradually goes
down over the forecast horizon. Mankiw (1987) argue that government spending depresses
the real interest rate due to a wealth effect. Economic agents reduce private consumption in
anticipation of an increase in tax in the future. This increases the marginal utility of con-
sumption lowering the marginal rate of substitution, hence marginal productivity of capital
also declines. These results conform to Laubach (2009) and Choi and Holmes (2014). The
increase in real interest rate on impact (and remain positive for about a year) in the bad
state (recession) bear evidence for potential crowding out effect (see figure 3.6).
69
Figure 3.5: Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to growth in Budget Deficit
+1 Standard Deviation increase in Growth in Budget Deficit
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Figure 3.6: Time path for Real Interest Rate
Case: Growth in Budget Deficit
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Figure 3.7 below shows the 15 quarter ahead nonlinear impulse responses for inflation and
interest rate with +1 standard deviation increase in the output gap. For intuitive purposes,
we can interpret this as a case of a positive supply shock to the economy. An increase in
the output gap implies positive response of the economy, where output in the economy is
increasing. During economic expansions we observe the demand to grow, unemployment to
go down, investment and consumption increase over time. Similar to cases of growth in the
money supply and the growth in the budget deficit, we can find that both inflation and short-
term 3-month Treasury bill interest rate responds after one-quarter and display asymmetry.
We observe initial deflation, although the deflationary phenomena are short-lived in the bad
state as opposed to the good state. Thus we observe some evidence of counter-cyclicality,
where the counter-cyclicality is more prevalent in the good state in contrast to the bad state.
Short-term 3-month Treasury bill rate keeps rising in both states although the increase is
larger in the good state as opposed to the bad state. When we combine the inflation and
the short-run interest rate we find that in the bad state the real interest rate rises initially
but then fall again with respect to a positive increase in the output gap (see figure 3.8).
However, during the good state, we observe the real interest rate to remain low for up to 4
quarters and then start rising. The output gap also finds an asymmetric response to inflation
and short-term interest rate. The real interest rate is pro-cyclical, arguably the expanding
economy increases demand and supply.
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Figure 3.7: Nonlinear Impulse Response with shock to Output Gap
+1 Standard Deviation increase in the Output Gap
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Figure 3.8: Time path for Real Interest Rate
Case: Increase in the Output Gap
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Real Interest Rate in Good State Real Interest Rate in Bad State
72
3.5 Conclusion
In this essay, we analyze the response of inflation, short-term interest rate, and real inter-
est rate during a good state (expansion) and a bad state (recession). It is imperative for
us to understand as to how the economy will respond to increases in the fiscal deficit and
the money supply during a recession as opposed to economic expansion. Economic agents
resource allocation decision is closely related to these variables. In the presence of business
cycle, these variables are likely to respond in a differential manner. We employ a threshold
VAR model and nonlinear impulse response functions to investigate the dynamic behavior
of inflation, short-term interest rate, and real interest rate.
In our analysis, we find specification test of linear VAR against nonlinear VAR rejects the
null. Thus we estimate a TVAR and proceed with the nonlinear impulse response analysis.
In this paper using quarterly U.S. data, we find that both inflation and short-run interest
rates behave asymmetrically with increases in the growth in money supply and the budget
deficits. When we combine the future trajectory of inflation and short-run interest rates to
analyze the behavior of real interest rate, we observe asymmetry and counter-cyclicality. We
find the liquidity effect is dominant in the bad state when there is a growth in money supply,
but the expected inflation and the income effects dominate the liquidity effect eventually.
An increase in the growth in budget deficits tends to be deflationary in the bad state, and
short-term interest rate declines. Time path for real interest rate indicates that the wealth
effect is relatively more dominant in the good state. Time path for projected real interest
rate indicates asymmetry. The output gap also finds an asymmetric response to inflation
and short-term interest rate. Real interest rate is pro-cyclical.
Thus, existing opposing or contradictory conclusions regarding the effects of deficit and
money supply on interest could potentially arise from asymmetry. As a policy recommenda-
tion, we argue for deficit reduction during economic expansions.
73
Bibliography
Abel, A., B., Bernanke, B., S., and Croushore, D. (2014). Macroeconomics. New
York:Pearson.
Afonso, A., Baxa, J., and Slav´ık, M. (2011). Fiscal developments and financial stress: a
threshold var analysis. Empirical Economics, pages 1–29.
Ahmed, S. and Rogers, J. H. (1995). Government budget deficits and trade deficits are
present value constraints satisfied in long-term data? Journal of Monetary Economics,
36(2):351–374.
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1997). Fiscal adjustments in oecd countries: composition and
macroeconomic effects. Staff Papers, 44(2):210–248.
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990). A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government
debt. The Review of Economic Studies, 57(3):403–414.
Allen, S. D. and Smith, M. D. (1983). Government borrowing and monetary accommodation.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(4):605–616.
Andrews, D. W. (1994). Empirical process methods in econometrics. Handbook of Econo-
metrics, 4:2247–2294.
Arestis, P., Cipollini, A., and Fattouh, B. (2004). Threshold effects in the us budget deficit.
Economic Inquiry, 42(2):214–222.
Bae, J., Kim, C.-J., and Kim, D. H. (2012). The evolution of the monetary policy regimes
in the us. Empirical Economics, pages 1–33.
Balassone, F., Francese, M., and Zotteri, S. (2010). Cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables
in the eu. Empirica, 37(4):381–402.
74
Balke, N. S. and Fomby, T. B. (1997). Threshold cointegration. International Economic
Review, pages 627–645.
Barro, R. J. (1979). On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy,
87(5, Part 1):940–971.
Barro, R. J. (1986). Us deficits since world war i. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
pages 195–222.
Barro, R. J. (1987). Government spending, interest rates, prices, and budget deficits in the
united kingdom, 1701–1918. Journal of Monetary Economics, 20(2):221–247.
Barry, F. and Devereux, M. B. (1995). The’expansionary fiscal contraction’hypothesis: A
neo-keynesian analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, pages 249–264.
Bianchi, F. and Ilut, C. (2017). Monetary/fiscal policy mix and agents’ beliefs. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 26:113–139.
Blake, A. P. and Kirsanova, T. (2012). Discretionary policy and multiple equilibria in lq re
models. The Review of Economic Studies, 79(4):1309–1339.
Blommestein, H. J. and Turner, P. (2011). Interactions between soverign debt management
and monetary policy under fiscal dominance and financial instability.
Bohn, H. (1998). The behavior of us public debt and deficits. the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(3):949–963.
Bohn, H. (2007). Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the
intertemporal budget constraint? Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(7):1837–1847.
Bra¨uninger, T. (2005). A partisan model of government expenditure. Public Choice,
125(3):409–429.
Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., and Fisher, J. D. (2004). Fiscal shocks and their conse-
quences. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(1):89–117.
75
Calvo, G. A. (1988). Servicing the public debt: The role of expectations. The American
Economic Review, pages 647–661.
Cassou, S. P., Scott, C. P., and Va´zquez, J. (2012). Optimal monetary policy with asym-
metric preferences for output. Economics Letters, 117(3):654–656.
Cassou, S. P., Shadmani, H., and Va´zquez, J. (2015). Fiscal policy asymmetries and the
sustainability of us government debt revisited. Empirical Economics, pages 1–23.
Cassou, S. P. and Va´zquez, J. (2014). Employment comovements at the sectoral level over
the business cycle. Empirical Economics, 46(4):1301–1323.
Catao, L. A. and Terrones, M. E. (2005). Fiscal deficits and inflation. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 52(3):529–554.
Cebula, R. J. (1988). Federal government budget deficits and interest rates: a brief note.
Southern Economic Journal, pages 206–210.
Chan, K.-S. (1993). Consistency and limiting distribution of the least squares estimator of
a threshold autoregressive model. The Annals of Statistics, pages 520–533.
Chen, X., Leeper, E. M., and Leith, C. (2015). Us monetary and fiscal policies-conflict or
cooperation?
Choi, D. F. and Holmes, M. J. (2014). Budget deficits and real interest rates: a regime-
switching reflection on ricardian equivalence. Journal of Economics and Finance, 38(1):71–
83.
Choi, W. G. (1999). Asymmetric monetary effects on interest rates across monetary policy
stances. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pages 386–416.
Choi, W. G. and Devereux, M. B. (2006). Asymmetric effects of government spending: does
the level of real interest rates matter? IMF Staff Papers, pages 147–181.
76
Clarida, R., Gali, J., and Gertler, M. (2000). Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic
stability: evidence and some theory. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1):147–
180.
Corsetti, G. and Dedola, L. (2014). The” mystery of the printing press. Monetary Policy
and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises.
Darrat, A. F. (1990). Structural federal deficits and interest rates: some causality and
co-integration tests. Southern Economic Journal, pages 752–759.
Davig, T. (2005). Periodically expanding discounted debt: a threat to fiscal policy sustain-
ability? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20(7):829–840.
Devereux, M. (2010). Fiscal deficits, debt, and monetary policy in a liquidity trap. Docu-
mentos de Trabajo (Banco Central de Chile), (581):1.
Devereux, M. B. and Love, D. R. (1995). The dynamic effects of government spending
policies in a two-sector endogenous growth model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
pages 232–256.
Dı´az-Gime´nez, J., Giovannetti, G., Marimon, R., and Teles, P. (2008). Nominal debt as a
burden on monetary policy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(3):493–514.
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1981). Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time
series with a unit root. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1057–
1072.
Dwyer, G. P. (1982). Inflation and government deficits. Economic Inquiry, 20(3):315–329.
Enders, W. (2010). Applied Econometric Time Series. New York:Wiley and Sons.
Enders, W. and Granger, C. W. J. (1998). Unit-root tests and asymmetric adjustment with
an example using the term structure of interest rates. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics, 16(3):304–311.
77
Enders, W. and Siklos, P. L. (2001). Cointegration and threshold adjustment. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 19(2):166–176.
Engen, E. M. and Hubbard, R. G. (2004). Federal government debt and interest rates. NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 19:83–138.
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: representation,
estimation, and testing. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 251–
276.
Evans, P. (1987). Interest rates and expected future budget deficits in the united states.
Journal of Political Economy, 95(1):34–58.
Fischer, S., Sahay, R., and Ve´gh, C. A. (2002). Modern hyper-and high inflations. Journal
of Economic Literature, 40(3):837–880.
Glenn, L. M. and Samad, A. (2012). Fiscal and monetary policies interrelation and inflation
over the long run: Testing sargent and wallaces view for the united states. The Journal
of Business, 11(1):58–70.
Golinelli, R. and Momigliano, S. (2009). The cyclical reaction of fiscal policies in the euro
area: the role of modelling choices and data vintages. Fiscal Studies, 30(1):39–72.
Hakkio, C. S. and Rush, M. (1991). Is the budget deficit too large?. Economic Inquiry,
29(3):429–445.
Hamilton, J. D. and Flavin, M. (1985). On the limitations of government borrowing: A
framework for empirical testing.
Hansen, B. E. (1996). Inference when a nuisance parameter is not identified under the null
hypothesis. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 413–430.
Hansen, B. E. and Seo, B. (2002). Testing for two-regime threshold cointegration in vector
error-correction models. Journal of Econometrics, 110(2):293–318.
78
Hatzinikolaou, D. and Simos, T. (2013). A new test for deficit sustainability and its appli-
cation to us data. Empirical Economics, pages 1–19.
Hodrick, R. J. and Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar us business cycles: an empirical investi-
gation. Journal of Money, credit, and Banking, pages 1–16.
Johansen, S. (1991). Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in gaussian
vector autoregressive models. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages
1551–1580.
Kim, C.-J. and Nelson, C. R. (2006). Estimation of a forward-looking monetary policy rule:
A time-varying parameter model using ex post data. Journal of Monetary Economics,
53(8):1949–1966.
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H., and Potter, S. M. (1996). Impulse response analysis in nonlinear
multivariate models. Journal of Econometrics, 74(1):119–147.
Kremers, J. J. (1989). Us federal indebtedness and the conduct of fiscal policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 23(2):219–238.
Krishnakumar, J., Neto, D., et al. (2009). Estimation and testing for the cointegration rank
in a threshold cointegrated system. Cahiers du de´partement de´conome´trie, Faculte´ des
siences e´conomiques et socliales, Universite´ de Gene`ve.
Lambertini, L. and Rovelli, R. (2003). Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroe-
conomic stabilization. a theoretical analysis.
Laubach, T. (2009). New evidence on the interest rate effects of budget deficits and debt.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4):858–885.
Lee, J. and Strazicich, M. C. (2003). Minimum lagrange multiplier unit root test with two
structural breaks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(4):1082–1089.
Leeper, E. M. and Leith, C. (2016). Understanding inflation as a joint monetary–fiscal
phenomenon. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2:2305–2415.
79
Lo, M. C. and Zivot, E. (2001). Threshold cointegration and nonlinear adjustment to the
law of one price. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5(04):533–576.
Lucas, R. E. and Stokey, N. L. (1983). Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy
without capital. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1):55–93.
Lumsdaine, R. L. and Papell, D. H. (1997). Multiple trend breaks and the unit-root hypoth-
esis. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(2):212–218.
Mahdavi, S. (2014). Bohn’s test of fiscal sustainability of the american state governments.
Southern Economic Journal, 80(4):1028–1054.
Makin, J. H. (1983). Real interest, money surprises, anticipated inflation and fiscal deficits.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, pages 374–384.
Mankiw, N. G. (1987). Government purchases and real interest rates. Journal of Political
Economy, 95(2):407–419.
Mankiw, N. G. (2016). Macroeconomics. New York:Worth.
Marcet, A. and Scott, A. (2009). Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond
markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2):473–501.
Mise, E., Kim, T.-H., and Newbold, P. (2005). On suboptimality of the hodrick–prescott
filter at time series endpoints. Journal of Macroeconomics, 27(1):53–67.
Orphanides, A. (2004). Monetary policy rules, macroeconomic stability, and inflation: A
view from the trenches. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(2):151–175.
Perotti, R. (1999). Fiscal policy in good times and bad. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(4):1399–1436.
Perron, P. (1989). The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis. Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1361–1401.
80
Persson, T. and Svensson, L. E. (1989). Why a stubborn conservative would run a
deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
104(2):325–345.
Phillips, P. C. and Ouliaris, S. (1990). Asymptotic properties of residual based tests for
cointegration. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 165–193.
Pippenger, M. K. and Goering, G. E. (1993). Practitioners corner: A note on the empirical
power of unit root tests under threshold processes. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 55(4):473–481.
Primiceri, G. E. (2005). Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy.
The Review of Economic Studies, 72(3):821–852.
Quintos, C. E. (1995). Sustainability of the deficit process with structural shifts. Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 13(4):409–417.
Ramey, V. A. and Shapiro, M. D. (1998). Costly capital reallocation and the effects of gov-
ernment spending. In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, volume 48,
pages 145–194. Elsevier.
Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2003). Inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(5):763–785.
Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2004). The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate
of unemployment. European Economic Review, 48(1):91–107.
Siklos, P. L. and Granger, C. W. (1997). Regime-sensitive cointegration with an application
to interest-rate parity. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1(03):640–657.
Sims, C. A. (2013). Paper money. The American Economic Review, 103(2):563–584.
Sims, C. A. and Zha, T. (2006). Were there regime switches in us monetary policy? The
American Economic Review, 96(1):54–81.
81
Sutherland, A. (1997). Fiscal crises and aggregate demand: can high public debt reverse the
effects of fiscal policy? Journal of Public Economics, 65(2):147–162.
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. In Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, volume 39, pages 195–214. Elsevier.
Terzi, A. (2007). Fiscal deficits in the us and europe: Revisiting the link with interest rates.
Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis Working Paper, 4.
Thornton, D. L. (2010). Monetizing the debt. Economic Synopsis, pages 1–2.
Thornton, D. L. (2012). The us deficit/debt problem: a longer-run perspective. Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 94(6):441–455.
Tong, H. (1990). Non-linear time series: a dynamical system approach. Oxford University
Press.
Trehan, B. and Walsh, C. E. (1988). Common trends, the government’s budget constraint,
and revenue smoothing. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12(2-3):425–444.
Tsay, R. S. (1998). Testing and modeling multivariate threshold models. journal of the
American Statistical Association, 93(443):1188–1202.
Uctum, M. and Wickens, M. (2000). Debt and deficit ceilings, and sustainability of fiscal poli-
cies: an intertemporal analysis. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62(2):197–
222.
Von Hagen, J. and Wolff, G. B. (2006). What do deficits tell us about debt? empirical
evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the eu. Journal of Banking & Finance,
30(12):3259–3279.
Wachtel, P. and Young, J. (1987). Deficit announcements and interest rates. The American
Economic Review, 77(5):1007–1012.
Wilcox, D. W. (1989). The sustainability of government deficits: Implications of the present-
value borrowing constraint. Journal of Money, credit and Banking, 21(3):291–306.
82
Appendix A
Nonlinear Impulse Response
Computation Algorithm for Chapters
1 and 3
Algorithm to compute nonlinear impulse responses:
1. The shocks for the periods from 0 to q are drawn from the residuals of the estimated
VAR model
2. For each initial value this sequence of shocks is fed through the model to produce
forecasts conditional on initial conditions.
3. Repeat step 2) with the initial shock into one variable equal to +/- 1 or 2 SD to get
forecasts if there was an initial shock.
4. The difference between the forecasts from step 2 and 3 is the impulse response function.
Repeat this 500-times and derive an average impulse response for this particular initial
condition
5. Repeat steps 2-4 for each initial conditions. Final impulse responses are average impulse
responses over initial conditions of each regime.
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Figure A.1: Nonlinear Impulse Response
Figure: Response of Debt to GDP Ratio
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Figure A.2: Nonlinear Impulse Response
Figure: Response of Debt to GDP Ratio
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Appendix B
TVECM Tables for Chapter 2
The following tables show the full model with threshold effect on all the right hand side
variables.
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Table B.1: Threshold Vector Error Correction Model
Full Sample, Threshold in All RHS variables
∆ECTt−1 = (|DeltaLDt−1 − 1.37∆Lbt−1) ≥ −0.0152
∆LDt ∆LDt
Constant
0.001***
(0.0006)
0.003***
(0.0006)
ECTHt−1
-0.002**
(0.003)
-0.0005
(0.001)
∆LDHt−1
0.25***
(0.04)
0.003
(0.03)
∆LDHt−2
0.0006
(0.03)
0.08***
(0.02)
∆LDHt−3
0.16***
(0.04)
0.07***
(0.02)
∆LBHt−1
0.13*
(0.08)
0.16
(0.16)
∆LBHt−2
0.08
(0.05)
-0.17***
(0.02)
∆LBHt−3
0.11**
(0.05)
0.13
(0.09)
∆ECTt−1 = (|DeltaLDt−1 − 1.37∆Lbt−1) < −0.0152
Constant
0.008***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.005)
ECTLt−1
0.007**
(0.002)
0.005
(0.004)
∆LDLt−1
0.37*
(0.22)
0.37
(0.29)
∆LDLt−2
0.36**
(0.19)
0.02
(0.14)
∆LDLt−3
-0.04
(0.09)
-0.08
(0.09)
∆LBLt−1
0.03
(0.08)
0.89***
(0.24)
∆LBLt−2
-0.07
(0.12)
-0.32
(0.16)
∆LBLt−3
0.02
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.15)
Note: 1. Eicker-White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Standard Error,
2. Approximately 84.72% observation in higher regime and 15.28% in lower regime.
87
Table B.2: Threshold Vector Error Correction Model
Sub-sample: 1946 to 2007, Threshold in All RHS variables
∆ECTt−1 = (|DeltaLDt−1 − 1.42∆Lbt−1) ≥ −0.0106
∆LDt ∆LDt
Constant
0.001
(0.0008)
0.002***
(0.0004)
ECTHt−1
-0.003**
(0.001)
-0.002**
(0.0009)
∆LDHt−1
0.26***
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.02)
∆LDHt−2
-0.005
(0.041)
0.07**
(0.02)
∆LDHt−3
0.18***
(0.04)
0.07***
(0.01)
∆LBHt−1
0.08
(0.12)
0.27**
(0.08)
∆LBHt−2
0.19
(0.12)
-0.04
(0.07)
∆LBHt−3
-0.02
(0.11)
0.11**
(0.05)
∆ECTt−1 = (|DeltaLDt−1 − 1.42∆Lbt−1) < −0.0106
Constant
-0.003
(0.003)
0.00001
(0.001)
ECTLt−1
0.009**
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
∆LDLt−1
0.23
(0.20)
-0.04
(0.07)
∆LDLt−2
0.33**
(0.13)
0.08*
(0.04)
∆LDLt−3
-0.03
(0.09)
0.13***
(0.03)
∆LBLt−1
0.42
(0.39)
-0.008
(0.22)
∆LBLt−2
0.64
(0.42)
0.43**
(0.14)
∆LBLt−3
0.57**
(0.25)
0.26**
(0.11)
Note: 1. Eicker-White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Standard Error,
2. Approximately 77.78% observation in higher regime and 22.22% in lower regime.
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Appendix C
Sensitivity Analysis TVECM Tables
for Chapter 2
The following tables show the full model with threshold effect on the error correction term
only.
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Table C.1: Threshold Vector Error Correction Model
Full Sample, Threshold in ECT Only
∆LDt ∆LDt
Constant
0.003***
(0.0006)
0.002***
(0.0008)
ECTHt−1
-0.002***
(0.0008)
-0.002
(0.001)
ECTLt−1
0.007***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
∆LDHt−1
0.24***
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
∆LDHt−2
0.05
(0.04)
0.07**
(0.03)
∆LDHt−3
0.14***
(0.03)
0.008
(0.03)
∆LBHt−1
0.11**
(0.04)
0.66***
(0.18)
∆LBHt−2
-0.02
(0.06)
-0.22**
(0.09)
∆LBHt−3
0.04
(0.03)
0.03
(0.13)
Note: 1. Eicker-White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Standard Error,
2. Approximately 84.72% observation in higher regime and 15.28% in lower regime.
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Table C.2: Threshold Vector Error Correction Model
Full Sample, Threshold in ECT Only
∆LDt ∆LDt
Constant
0.000006
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.0004)
ECTHt−1
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.0009)
ECTLt−1
0.007*
(0.004)
-0.0008
(0.002)
∆LDHt−1
0.16***
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.02)
∆LDHt−2
0.04
(0.04)
0.07***
(0.02)
∆LDHt−3
0.12***
(0.04)
0.08***
(0.01)
∆LBHt−1
0.38***
(0.14)
0.22**
(0.08)
∆LBHt−2
0.31**
(0.12)
0.01
(0.07)
∆LBHt−3
0.14
(0.11)
0.13***
(0.04)
Note: 1. Eicker-White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Standard Error,
2. Approximately 77.78% observation in higher regime and 22.22% in lower regime.
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